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REVIVING THE 1940 CUBAN CONSTITUTION:
ARGUMENTS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
RIGHTS IN A POST-CASTRO GOVERNMENT
Jonathan Wachs*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many people have considered what form the Cuban
legal structure might take if Fidel Castro were no longer in power.' Ob-
servers monitoring Cuba throughout the United States have speculated
about the future of Cuban law in various fields including property re-
form, constitutional law, investment, and claims restitution! As part of
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Washington College of Law, The American University;
B.A., 1991, University of Pennsylvania. The author dedicates this Comment to the
members of his family, Herbert, Susan, Michelle, and Beth Wachs, who use a team
approach to address the opportunities and challenges of life.
1. See Gillian Gunn, Balancing Economic EIciency, Social Concerns and Politi-
cal Control, 5 CUBA BRIEING PAPER SERIES 1 (The Cuba Project, Center for Latin
American Studies, Georgetown Univ. 1994) (describing a novel proposal for post-Cas-
tro claims restitution); Ernest H. Preeg, Cuba and the Caribbean, GLOBAl. Bus.
WHrrE PAPERS (The Conference Board), Jan. 1994, at 12 (envisioning a legal regime
for private property rights in post-Castro Cuba); Richard Boudreaux. Can Castro
Weather Storm?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Boudreaux. Can Castro
Weather Storm] (discussing technical problems Cuba may encounter in a transition
from socialism to capitalism); FREE-MARKET CUBA Bus. J., Winter 1992, at 2 (on
file with the law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge) (dedicating the publica-
tion to the discussion of "legal, legislative and commercial issues of importance to
those interested in doing business in a free-market Cuba").
2. See Busnss INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, DEVELOPING BUSINESS STRATE-
GIES FOR CUBA 73 (1992) (outlining recommendations for post-Castro legal reforms in
privatization, banking, and foreign investment); ALBERT P. BLAUsTEIN, CONSTUTIO.
OF THE REPBLIc OF CUBA: A PROPOSED DRAFT (Cuba Paper Series. Cuban Ameri-
can National Foundation 1993) [hereinafter BLAUSTEIN. CONSTITTION] (articulating
provisions to be included in a post-Castro Cuban constitution); Stanley J. Glod. East-
ern European Models for Cuban Foreign Restitution Claims, FREE MARKET CUBA
Bus. J., Winter 1993, at 5 (on file with the law irm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge) (providing examples of ways in which Cuba could structure a post-Castro
foreign claims restitution system).
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the continuing effort to examine possible scenarios for the future of
Cuban constitutional law, this Comment examines how legislators in a
post-Castro government might use the 1940 Cuban Constitution to rec-
oncile the nation's historically strong constitutional commitment to social
and economic rights with the modern reality of a severely declining
economic condition.
As indicated by several market-oriented legal reforms which Castro
initiated in the 1990s to reverse the nation's economic freefall,3 Cuba
appears poised for significant political and legal change.4 Despite the
fact that Castro's health, charisma, and determination appear to be sta-
ble,5 Cuban economic resources no longer can support many of the
socialist policies and institutions he created.6 Because the Cuban legal
system under Castro has failed to respond to political and economic
shocks caused by the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the
tightening of the United States embargo,7 the need to develop a drasti-
3. See Douglas Farah, Cuban Economy Recovering-But Capitalism Still Taboo,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1994, at Al (noting that during 1993 Castro set in motion sev-
eral new laws which will bring more United States dollars, private sector initiatives,
and joint ventures into the Cuban economy).
4. Roberto Fabricio, Castro Seeks Help for Survival at Latin Summit: Signals
Recently Have Been Coming Out of Cuba That Indicate Political Changes May Be
Imminent, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 13, 1993, at A3 (recognizing several factors that
indicate the Cuban socialist system is deteriorating rapidly).
5. See Michael Stott, Castro Gives Ringing Defense of Socialism, The Reuter
Library Report, Aug. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(noting that Castro declared he will never resign from office); David Adams, The Cu-
ban Revolution on Its Final Spin: Castro's Tattered Experiment is Reflected in Grim
Street, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 15, 1993, at A8 (noting that Castro is in good phys-
ical condition and follows a strict diet and exercise program).
6. See Adams, supra note 5, at A8 (suggesting that food and fuel shortages will
force Cuba to significantly alter its socialist system in the near future); Kathleen
Barrett, The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc: Effects on Cuban
Health Care, 2 CUBA BRIEFING PAPER SERIES 1 (The Cuba Project, Center for Latin
American Studies, Georgetown Univ. 1993) (observing that the termination of Soviet
aid and the tightening of the U.S. embargo have caused the Cuban health-care system
to deteriorate seriously and rapidly); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Social Safety Net in the
Two Cuban Transitions [hereinafter Mesa-Lago, Social Safety Net], in The Cuban Re-
search Institute, TRANSITION IN CUBA: NEW CHALLENGES FOR U.S. POLICY 601, 601
(Lisandro Pdrez, ed., 1993) (noting that in 1992 the cost to the Cuban Government of
providing a social safety net rose from 17% to 26% of the national Gross Social
Product, and that these expenditures are now "unbearable").
7. See Adams, supra note 5, at A8 (stating that the demise of the former Soviet
bloc has caused Cuba to lose 85% of its foreign markets and 50% of its hard curren-
cy earnings); Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 § 1706(a), 22 U.S.C. § 6005 (Supp.
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cally revised or entirely new Cuban legal structure appears imminent
When Cubans do attempt to redesign their legal system, the framers
of the -new constitution can look to Cuba's extensive constitutional heri-
tage for guidance.9 In particular, post-Castro constitution framers may
examine the 1940 Constitution, which embodies Cuba's time-honored
political and social philosophy in reflecting a strong desire to promote
national autonomy and social commitment." Unlike the Cuban constitu-
tions prepared under Spanish or American guidance, the 1940 Constitu-
tion explicitly guaranteed rights to employment, minimum acceptable
standards for working conditions, property ownership, education, and
social security. Because the relevant provisions of this document are
1992) (extending the 30-year-old United States embargo against Cuba to all foreign
subsidiaries of United States corporations); Robert Torricelli, Cuba Embargo Has Had
Desired Effect, N. Y. TmEs, Jan. 5, 1994, at A14 (stating that, as a result of the
Cuban Democracy Act, United States trade to Cuba through foreign subsidiaries de-
clined from $718 million in 1991 to $1.6 million in 1993); Gunn. supra note 1. at I
(noting that at the end of 1993, 69% of Cuban state enterprises operated at a loss,
with little prospect for future profitability).
8. See Robert Mason Lee, Spies Quarterly: A Glimpse at How Our Spy Agency
Sees the Post-Cold War World Unfolding, OrFAVA CIZEN, Oct. 4, 1992, at A2
(quoting Charles Svoboda, an official at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
who claims that pressure for dramatic change in Cuba during the 1990s could become
insurmountable).
9. See William T. D'Zurilla, Cuba's 1976 Socialist Constitution and the
Fidelista Interpretation of Cuban Constitutional History, 55 TUL. L REv. 1223, 1227-
41 (1981) (outlining seven Cuban constitutions written in the 19th and 20th centuries).
10. See 2 INT'L BUREAU OF THE AM. REPUBS., AMERICAN CONSTrrtTONS 109
(Jos6 Ignacio Rodriguez trans. 1907) (hist. notes) [hereinafter Rodriguez, notes] (de-
claring in a commentary to the 1901 Cuban Constitution that in terms of its ethnic
composition, governmental institutions, and social traditions, Cuba is more dedicated to
social commitment than any other nation in the Western Hemisphere); Mesa-Lago, So-
cial Safety Net, supra note 6, at 601 (noting that throughout the Cold War era, Cuba
maintained a stronger social safety net than any other socialist or Latin American
country).
11. CoNsTrrUc16N DE LA REPOBUCA DE CUBA, July 1. 1940, Gaceta Oficial No.
646, July 8, 1940 [hereinafter 1940 CONST.] arts. 48, 49, 60, 65-68. 79, 90, 91,
translated in AMOS J. PEASLEE, 1 CONS'rrtmoNs OF NATIONS 610 (2d ed. 1956).
Under Title V, vocational and primary school education are free. Id. art. 48. This
Title also stipulates that the State must provide schools to foster adult literacy among
rural citizens. Id. art. 49. Title VI, section 1 (Labor) guarantees Cuban citizens the
right to employment (art. 60), social security (art. 65), an eight hour maximum work
day and a forty hour maximum work week (art. 66). one month paid vacation annu-
ally (art. 67), three months paid maternity leave (art. 68), and employer provided
housing for certain workers (art. 79). Id. Title VI, section 2 (Property) provides that
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notably expansive and detailed, however, many Cuban-studies scholars
view the 1940 Constitution as incompatible with Cuba's anticipated
political and economic conditions.'2
When placed in a comparative context, the economic and social rights
granted by the 1940 Constitution appear to be more extensive than cor-
responding provisions contained in the constitutions of formerly socialist
Eastern European countries. 3 Some of these constitutions rely on one
large landholdings are proscribed and foreign investments in Cuban real property shall
be "restrictively limited" (art. 90), and that ownership of family farms shall be perma-
nently protected (art. 91). Id.
12. See Matias Travieso-Diaz, Overview of Legal Changes in Cuba's Market
Transition 6 (Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Workshop, Strategies for the First
Year of Cuba's Transition) (Jan. 27, 1994) (on file with the law firm of Shaw,
Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge) (suggesting that the inclusion of various property and
labor rights contained in the 1940 Constitution would, if included in a post-Castro
constitution, hinder Cuba's efforts to develop a prosperous, free-market economy).
Professor Blaustein's proposed post-Castro constitution also fails to support several of
the guarantees provided in the 1940 Constitution. See BLAUSTEIN, CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, arts. 18-29 (articulating social and economic rights which require fewer
and less extensive government obligations). Under the Blaustein proposal, the right to
education is preserved. Id. art. 21. Social and economic security is "advanced"
through privatized government agencies instead of guaranteed by state organs. Id. art.
18. Economic rights include the right of the state to privatize companies (art. 25),
freedom of contract and the right of free trade (arts. 26-27), and the right of employ-
ers to select their own employees Id. art. 28. Minimal working conditions, maximum
work hours, and vacation periods are to be prescribed by statute. Id. art. 28.
13. BULG. CONST. (adopted Jul. 12, 1991), translated in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. 1992)
[hereinafter CONSTrrUTIONS]; 1940 CUBAN CONST., supra note 11; CZECH CONST.
(adopted Dec. 16, 1992), translated in 5 CONSTITUTIONS (1993), supra; Czechoslovak
Constitutional Law of January, 1991 Enacting the Bill of Basic Human Rights and
Freedoms, translated in National Telecommunications Information Service, CENTRAL &
EASTERN EUROPE LEGAL TEXTS, available in LEXIS, World Library, EELEG File;
ESTONIAN CONST. (adopted June 28, 1992), translated in 6 CONSTITUTIONS (1994),
supra; HUNG. CONST. (adopted Dec. 31, 1990), translated in National Telecommunica-
tions Information Service, CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE LEGAL TEXTS, available in
LEXIS, World Library, EELEG File; The Constitutional Act of 17th October 1992
(Poland) (effective Dec. 8, 1992), translated in 15 CONSTITrrTIONS (1993), supra;
Charter on Rights and Liberties (Pol. 1992), translated in National Telecommunica-
tions Information Service, CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE LEGAL TEXTS, available in
LEXIS, World Library, EELEG File; ROM. CONST. (adopted Nov. 21, 1991) translat-
ed in 15 CONSTITUTIONS (1992), supra; SLOVAK. CONST. (adopted Sept. 3, 1992),
translated in 17 CONSTITUTIONS (1993), supra; YUGO. CONST. (adopted Apr. 27,
1992), translated in CONSTrrUTIONS (Supp. 1 1994), supra. Of the nine recently
drafted East European constitutions cited above, two grant a right to employment, five
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of several methods to avoid creating concrete social or economic rights.
Even though these constitutions address more topics in greater depth
than the United States Constitution, they still contain either. 1) vague,
noncommittal language on the social and economic aspirations of the
nation; 4 2) non-self-executing provisions stipulating that social and
economic commitments are to be prescribed by subsequent national
legislation that can be modified over time;s or 3) a clause allowing the
grant a right to minimal working conditions, eight grant a right to own property,
eight grant a right to education, and six grant a right to social security. Unlike the
1940 Cuban Constitution, however, eight of these new constitutions grant a right to
health care, and five grant a right to a clean environment. The distribution of these
social and economic provisions are:
Emp. Work Prop. Educ. Soc. Sec. Health
Cond.
Bulgaria N N Y Y Y Y
Cuba Y Y Y Y Y N
Czech Rep. Y* N Y N Y N
Czechoslovakia N N Y Y N Y
Estonia N N Y Y Y Y
Hungary N Y N Y N Y
Poland N Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
Romania N Y Y Y N Y
Slovakia Y Y Y Y Y Y
Yugoslavia N Y* Y Y N Y
* "programmatic rights" (rights granted only to the extent allowed by subsequent
national legislation) I.
14. See HUNG. CONST. (1990) art. 16, supra note 13 (stipulating that "The Re-
public of Hungary shall pay particular attention to the security of existence, education
and training of young people and protects the interests of youth"). While these provi-
sions promote socially desirable goals, they often do not create commitments a judi-
ciary could enforce against its government. See Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in East-
ern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 468 (1991) (discussing vague
language contained in social and economic provisions of the Hungarian Constitution
and the Slovak draft constitution).
15. See Charter on Rights and Liberties (Pol. 1992) art. 31, supra note 13 (man-
dating that the state must protect safe and hygienic working conditions by adopting
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national executive and/or the legislature to suspend social, economic,
political, or civil rights in a declared national emergency. 6 These pro-
visions support the perception that legislators must either dilute their
social and economic guarantees with one of the methods described
above or burden their economy with unrealistic welfare promises that
would politically and economically strangle their government and dis-
courage sorely needed infusions of foreign capital. 7
This Comment suggests that a post-Castro constitution could retain
meaningful social and economic commitments, albeit in a manner less
concrete and comprehensive than the 1940 Constitution, without resort-
ing to any of the aforementioned practices." It draws from previous
Cuban constitutions, newly written constitutions from other countries,
and international charters on social and economic guarantees. This Com-
ment also serves as a plea to post-Castro constitution drafters to create a
national legislation determining the maximum working hours, days off, and minimum
number of paid leave of absences). The provision of social and economic rights to be
defined and limited by statute is not an uncommon practice. See Mary Ann Glendon,
Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 527-28 (1992)
(noting that the constitutions of Scandinavia and Western Europe include this form of
constitutional guarantee).
16. BuLG. CONST. (1991) art. 57(3), supra note 13; Charter on Rights and Liber-
ties (Pol. 1992), supra note 13, art. 49; ROM. CONST. (1991) art. 49, supra note 13.
The suspension of rights during a case of emergency is not solely an East European
phenomenon. See Claudio Grossman, States of Emergency: Latin America and the
United States, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 176 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990)
(addressing this form of individual rights deprivation as it exists in Latin America).
17. See Robert C. Juelke, Note, The Economic Causes and Consequences of Con-
stitutional Reform in Eastern Europe, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1396-1400
(1993) (suggesting that social and economic guarantees in the new constitutions of
Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania will deter foreign capitalists from investing in these
countries); Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Winter
1993, at 35 [hereinafter Sunstein, Against Positive Rights] (arguing against social and
economic constitutional guarantees); Cass R. Sunstein, Something Old, Something New,
E. EuR. CONST. REV., Spring 1992, at 18 [hereinafter Sunstein, Something Old] (ex-
plaining the differences between the Western and the Eastern European views on so-
cial and economic rights).
18. See Herman Schwartz, Economic and Social Rights, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. &
POL'Y 551, 553 (1993) [hereinafter Schwartz, Economic and Social Rights] (suggesting
that modern constitutional drafts can and should contain social and economic guaran-
tees). Professor Schwartz further examined social and economic rights in the context
of constitutions in formerly Communist states. Herman Schwartz, In Defense of Aim-
ing High, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1992, at 25 [hereinafter Schwartz, Aiming
High].
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document that is both acceptable to the international community and
responsive to the particular challenges facing Cuba.
Part I of this Comment traces the development of social and econom-
ic guarantees throughout Cuban constitutional history. Part II reveals
several political reasons why future Cuban constitution drafters may
want to preserve social and economic rights. Part III employs economic
theory to suggest that Cuba could provide social and economic guaran-
tees in a manner that is not only socially desirable but also economical-
ly feasible. Part IV addresses the 1940 provisions individually and rec-
ommends a package of guarantees which maximizes social welfare and
minimizes economic and political costs. In the aggregate, this Comment
proposes that Cuba has the capacity to pursue social commitment and
political-economic viability simultaneously.
I. THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT
A. COLONIALISM UNDER THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION OF 1812
Cuba's first experience with constitutional law occurred in 1810 when
Cuban delegates travelled to Cadiz, Spain, to participate in the drafting
of the first Spanish constitution, referred to as the Cadiz Constitution or
the Constitution of 1812.9 The document's 384 articles contain several
liberal provisions, including a statement that "the nation is obliged by
wise and just laws to conserve and protect the civil liberty, property and
the legitimate rights of all individuals [protected] herein."' Cubans and
Spaniards alike quickly realized the feeble nature of these guarantees
when King Ferdinand VII repealed the Spanish constitution in 1814,
restored it by military order in 1820, and then permanently abolished it
in 1823.f
During the early to mid-1800s, wealthy Cuban creoles (people of
Spanish descent born on the island) and the Spanish Government devel-
oped a mutually beneficial partnership that denied to the majority of the
Cuban population all social and economic rights.' The creole
19. See Leonel De la Cuesta, Cuba, in CONSTrrLTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 2 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., 1976) [hereinafter De la
Cuesta, timeline] (providing a timeline of essential dates in Cuban constitutional histo-
ry).
20. LA CONsTITUCI6N DE 1812 art. 4, reprinted in Manuel Tufi6n de Lara. La
Espafla del siglo XIX, in SPANISH HISTORY: SELECTED TES FROM THE FALL OF
GRANADA IN 1492 To MODERM TMIES 135 (Salvador Ortiz-Carboneres, ed. 1989)
(author's translation).
21. De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 2.
22. See JUAN M. DEL AGUn.A, CUBA: DILEMMAS OF A REVOLUTION 13 (2d ed.
1994]
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latifundistas (owners of large land holdings) amassed considerable
wealth by running sugar and tobacco industries with the labor of small
wage earners and slaves.' In exchange for allowing creoles to derive a
disproportionate share of social and economic benefits, the Spanish Gov-
ernment received exclusive imports of Cuban products that it resold at
higher prices, and a promise that the latifundistas would not attempt to
establish national independence.' Because the Spanish Government ex-
cluded most classes from this arrangement, many Cubans began to re-
sent and distrust both the Cuban elite and the Spanish Crown.'
As the national production of sugar and tobacco expanded during the
first half of the 19th century, a rigid social and economic structure
evolved to accommodate the cultivation of these crops. 6 During this
period, Spain concentrated an overwhelming majority of the economic
privileges it granted to Cuba among the creole population, and distribut-
ed the few remaining privileges among lower classes in accordance with
a well-recognized social hierarchy.27 As the sugar and tobacco indus-
tries grew in the mid-1800s, the creoles became wealthier and obtained
more land, the need for slave labor increased, and the lower classes in
the Cuban socioeconomic order expanded accordingly.2
1988) (suggesting that creole elites gave political deference to the Spanish crown in
exchange for economic and social privileges); JAIME SUCHLICKI, FROM COLUMBUS TO
CASTRO 42 (1990) (noting that Cuban elites worked closely with Spanish authorities
to protect their economic interests).
23. See DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that creole planters drove out
less efficient competitors by using intensive slave labor and modem equipment).
24. DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 13.
25. See id. (noting that significant social and economic discrimination led to ten-
sions between creoles and other Cubans).
26. See MAx AZiCRI, CUBA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOcIETY 5 (1988) (not-
ing that the Cuban socioeconomic structure favored, in descending order, Spanish
settlers, the clergy and the military, creoles, mulattoes, free blacks, and slaves).
27. See Louts A. PtREZ, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION 93
(1988) [hereinafter PtREZ, BETWEEN REFORM] (noting that the creole population
owned the majority of the means of production and exercised substantial control over
the island); SUCHLICKI, supra note 22, at 42-43 (noting that the opportunities to de-
rive income during this time were distributed among latifundistas, small landholders,
landless peasants, and slaves, in that order).
28. See SUCHLIClI, supra note 22, at 43 (noting that the black population on
the island, including slaves and freed citizens, grew considerably between 1791 and
1872); PtREZ, BETWEEN REFORM, supra note 27, at 85 (noting that an estimated
750,000 slaves were brought to Cuba between 1763 and 1862). Another examination
of racial composition on the island shows that the slave population grew faster than
the freed black population during the early nineteenth century:
532 [VOL. 10: 1
1994] REVIVING THE CUBAN CONSTITUTION 533
B. THE CUBAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1868)
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF GUAIMARO (1869)
The first organized demand for Cuban economic and social rights oc-
curred in 1862 with the creation of the Reformist Party.' Instead of
striving for independence, the Reformist Party called for constitutional
reforms that would bring greater political and economic freedom to
Cuba without destroying the colonial relationship.- The Party agenda
included institutionalization of economic independence already recog-
nized in Cuba, abolishment of slavery, and termination of Cuban rep-
resentation in the Spanish Cortez.3 Because the Spanish Government
was preoccupied with and debilitated by domestic revolutionary pres-
sures," the Cuban people began to question Spain's ability to honor its
promises for reform.33 Consequently, the Reformist Party could not de-
liver significant political changes for Cuba. 3
As many Cubans became increasingly disenchanted with the Spanish
1817 1827 1846 1862
Whites 239,830 311,051 425,767 793,484
Freed 114,058 106,494 149,226 232,433
Slaves 199,145 286,946 323,759 370.533
Total 153,033 704,491 898,752 1,396,470
PtREZ, BETWEEN REFORI, supra note 27, at 86.
29. DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 14.
30. See PREZ, BETWEEN REFORM, supra note 27, at 113 (suggesting that Cuban
elites were not willing to sacrifice economic stability in order to gain political inde-
pendence).
31. DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 14. The Reformist Party also sought to gain
economic rights previously unrecognized by the Spanish crown. See PtREZ. BETWEEN
REFORM, supra note 27, at 112 (noting that the Reformists advocated freedom from
illegal confiscation of property and changes in tax and tariff laws).
32. See SucHLcKI, supra note 22, at 65-66 (noting that during these years the
Spanish Government defended itself against a revolutionary movement which later be-
came the Glorious Revolution of 1868).
33. See id. at 68 (noting that Carlos Manuel de C~spedes, the leader of the Cu-
ban independence movement, gained supporters by drawing attention to Spain's weak-
ened ability to exert control over its colonies).
34. See DEL AGUmLA, supra note 22, at 14 (indicating that the Reformist Party
agenda failed due to the fragile political climate in Spain).
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLT'Y
constitutional system, the movement for establishing Cuban autonomy
from Spain gained momentum quickly." On October 10, 1868, Carlos
Manuel de C6spedes, a lawyer and land owner not identified with the
latifundista cause, announced Cuba's Declaration of Independence from
Spain.36 The Declaration of Independence, also known as the Grito de
Yara, recognized the natural rights of all people and called for the grad-
ual cessation of slavery.37 This proclamation also initiated a ten-year
war which philosophically divided the Cuban people between reform and
revolution.38
In April 1869, de C6spedes convened delegates in the eastern town of
Gudimaro to draft a constitution that would implement the goals of the
Grito de Yara.39 The document they produced, the Constitution of
Gudimaro ("Gudimaro"), recognized many of the freedoms associated
with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution' and pro-
claimed an end to slavery by stating that "all inhabitants of the Republic
are entirely free."'" The philosophical tone of the document signalled a
progressive shift towards the protection of individual liberty and a trans-
formation in the focus of the Cuban constitutional movement away from
the interests of the wealthy creole class towards those of the larger,
landless population.42
35. See id. (providing explanations for the renewed momentum for the Cuban
independence movement).
36. De Ia Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 4; DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at
14.
37. See DECLARACION DE INDEPENDENCIA, Oct. 10, 1868, reprinted in JUAN
CLEMENTE ZAMORA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL DE CUBA: COLECCION DE
DOCUMENTOS SELECTOS PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LA HISTORIA POLITICA DE CUBA 210,
212 (1925) (calling for universal suffrage and the gradual emancipation of slaves).
38. See SUCHLICKI, supra note 22, at 72 (suggesting that the philosophical divi-
sion among Cuban rebels directly led to their defeat in the war).
39. See Emetrio S. Santovenia, La Asamblea Constituyente de Gudimaro, in LAS
CONsTrrucioNEs CU3ANAS DE GUAIMARO (1896), JIMAGUAY(J (1895) Y LA YAYA
(1897) 11 (1926) (discussing the events of the Gu~imaro Constitutional Convention).
40. See CONSTITUCI6N DE GUAIMARO, Apr. 10, 1869 [hereinafter GUAIMARO
CONST.] art. 28, reprinted in ZAMORA, supra note 37, at 216 (mandating that the
legislature cannot infringe upon the "freedom of worship, press, peaceful assembly,
teaching and petition, or any other inalienable right of the people") (author's transla-
tion).
41. GUAIMARO CONST. art. 24, reprinted in ZAMORA, supra note 37, at 216.
42. See D'Zurilla, supra note 9, at 1227-28 (noting that many Cuban scholars be-
lieve the Gudimaro Constitution incorporated theories from Montesquieu's separation of
power doctrine and the natural law concept of inalienable rights).
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C. THE PAcr OF ZANJON AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF BARAGUA (1878)
On February 10, 1878, the Cuban rebels and the Spanish Government
signed a peace agreement, entitled the Pact of Zanj6n, under which
Spain granted a partial end to slavery and a general amnesty for Cuban
freedom fighters while Cuban rebels discontinued their struggle for inde-
pendence.43 After the two nations signed the Pact, the preexisting philo-
sophical division continued to separate those Cubans supporting reform
under Spanish colonial rule from other Cubans supporting national inde-
pendence." While some rebel leaders accepted the peace plan, oth-
ers, notably General Antonio Maceo, rejected the Pact and vowed to
continue Cuba's struggle for political autonomy.' During this time,
Maceo promulgated a constitution called the Constitution of Baragui
("Baragu").47 The Cuban population never felt the full effect of this
constitution, however, because several months later Maceo withdrew
from fighting and went into exile.48 Although the Cuban Government
never fully implemented it,49 the Baragui Constitution had a lasting im-
pact on the philosophical focus of Cuban constitutional thought.O The
Baragud Constitution mandated that "unless Spain offered independence
to Cuba, the government must refuse to make peace without the consent
of the Cuban people."'" With this provision, Baragud built upon the
43. Pacto del Zanj6n, Feb. 10, 1878, Cuba-Spain, reprinted in 7-A.MORA. supra
note 37, at 226; De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 4-5.
44. DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 15.
45. See DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 15 (noting General Md1ximo G6mez ac-
cepted the Pact because his soldiers lost their military strength and political unity).
During the years immediately following the Zanj6n Pact, a political group called the
Autonomists was organized to promote an agenda similar to that of the earlier
Reformist Party. ld.
46. See PHImip S. FONER, ANToNIO MACEO: THE "BRONZE TITAN" OF CUBA'S
STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENcE 75-77 (1977) (noting that Maceo pledged to continue
fighting until Cuba gained its independence and abolished slavery).
47. De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 5.
48. FONER, supra note 46, at 86. Maceeo refrained from fighting and left Cuba on
May 10, 1878. Id.
49. See Louis A. PtRE7, JR., CUBA BETWEEN E.iPmES: 1878-1902, at 5 (1983)
(noting that the "Baragu Protest" as it is called lasted only ten weeks).
50. See D'Zurilla, supra note 9, at 1230 (noting that socialist scholars in Cuba
attach great value to the philosophical legacy of the Baragud charter).
51. CONSTrrUCI6N DE BARAGUA, Mar. 15, 1878 arts. 3-4, translated in D'Zurilla,
supra note 9, at 1229.
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foundations of Gudimaro in recognizing the Cuban people as the ulti-
mate source of Cuban political power. This provision further suggested
that, despite its long history of colonial domination, Cuba's constitution
must serve as more than a contract between a government and its con-
trolling hegemonic power. It must also serve as a contract between a
government and its citizens.
Just as Baragui changed the ideas associated with Cuban constitution-
al thought, it also changed the faces associated with the movement. As
both a well respected General and a black man deeply concerned with
the emancipation of Cuban slaves, Maceo was a uniquely competent
spokesman for social and economic advancement in Cuba. 2 As Fidel
Castro later noted, the Baragui Constitution signaled the transformation
in the leadership of the independence movement from the rich creoles to
the campesinos and liberated slaves.53 From this point forth, previously
silent sectors of the population became actively involved in the develop-
ment of constitutional guarantees to the disenfranchised population.'
D. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF JIMAGUAYJ (1895) AND LA YAYA (1897)
On February 24, 1895, the Cuban Revolutionary Party, under the
political leadership of Jos6 Martf and the military leadership of Antonio
Maceo and Mximo G6mez, revived the struggle for Cuban indepen-
dence by formally renewing the war against Spain.55 On September 13
of that year, the rebels adopted a provisional constitution, the Constitu-
tion of Jimaguayt ("Jimaguaytd"), in order to establish an operational
wartime government.56 The rebels stipulated that this document would
be the supreme law of Cuba for two years or until the end of the war,
52. See FONER, supra note 46, at 35 (noting Maceo's personal stake in the revo-
lutionary effort).
53. D'Zurilla, supra note 9, at 1230.
54. See id. (noting that since Baragud, the poorest sectors of the Cuban popula-
tion led the national movement for independence).
55. See De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 5 (recognizing the February 24,
1895 declaration of war, also known as the Grito de Baire). In March 1895, Martf,
Maceo, and G6mez further articulated the goals of the Cuban independence movement
in a proclamation entitled the Manifesto de Montecristi. MANIFESTO DE MONTECRISTI,
Mar. 25, 1895, reprinted in ZAMORA, supra note 37, at 244.
56. CONSTrrucI6N DE JIMAGUAY(I, Sept. 16, 1895 [hereinafter JIMAGUAY0
CONST.], reprinted in ZAMORA, supra note 37, at 254; Joaquin Llaverias, La
Asamblea Constituyente de Jimaguayfi, in LAS CONSTITUCIONES CUBANAS DE
GUAIMARO (1896), JIMAGUAYO (1895) Y LA YAYA (1897), at 19 (1926).
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whichever came first.' As it was an essentially political document,
Jimaguay-d contained no mention of social or economic guarantees.
On October 29, 1897 the rebels replaced the Constitution of
Jimaguayti with the Constitution of La Yaya ("La Yaya"), which was a
technically refined document containing a bill of rights. Although vir-
tually all the provisions in the relevant section of La Yaya addressed
political and civil rights, one article did provide free education for all
Cuban citizens." This was the first social guarantee contained in a Cu-
ban constitution. Nevertheless, La Yaya, like its Jimaguayti predecessor,
was primarily a political document.'
The War for Cuban Independence served to destroy not only the
political relationship between Spain and Cuba but also the socioeconom-
ic relationship between the creole elite and the popular classes.6' As
they executed G6mez' orders to cease all economic activity,' Cuban
rebels vigorously adopted the fight for social and economic equality. A
noted Cuban scholar, Louis A. Prez, Jr., summarized this conflict as a
war "waged against the beneficiaries of colonialism by the victims of
colonialism."'
E. THE 1901 CONSTITUTION AND THE PLAIT AMENDMENT
The War for Cuban Independence, which developed into the Spanish-
American War after the United States intervened, ended in 1898 when
Spain surrendered to the United States.' The Spanish and American
57. JIMAGUAYJ CONST. art. 24, reprinted in ZAMORA, supra note 37, at 257.
58. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA YAYA, Oct. 29, 1897 [hereinafter LA YAYA CONST.J.
reprinted in 7AORA, supra note 37, at 260. The drafters of La Yaya wanted this
constitution to promote social equality as envisioned by Martf, Macco, and G6mez in
the Manifesto de Montecristi. See Antonio L. Valverde, La Asamblea Constituyente de
La Yaya, in LAS CONSTITUCiONES CUBANAS DE GUAmiARO (1869), JIMAGUAY0 (1895)
Y LA YAYA (1897), at 25, 26 (1926) (discussing the events of the La Yaya Constitu-
tional Convention).
59. LA YAYA CONsT. Title II, art 8. reprinted in ZAMORA, supra note 37, at
261.
60. See LA YAYA CONST. Tide II, reprinted in ZAMORA, supra note 37. at 261
(providing 13 political and civil rights but only one social right).
61. See PPREZ, BETWEEN REFORMI, supra note 27, at 162 (suggesting that the
War removed the creole planter class from its position of socioeconomic domination).
62. See id. (recalling G6mez' July 1895 decree which stipulated that the govern-
ment would destroy estates found in violation of the moratorium on economic activity
and would execute people helping to operate sugar factories).
63. Id.
64. See Treaty of Paris, infra note 66 (recognizing that Spain relinquished all
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Governments did not invite representatives from the Cuban Government
to attend negotiations for the cessation of hostilities.' Because the
United States legally accepted several of the colonial obligations Spain
had assumed prior to the war,' many Cubans felt that their attainment
of formal independence was a Pyrrhic victory at best and a replacement
of imperialistic conquerors at worst. 7
A constitutional assembly representing the government of a newly
independent Cuba completed a constitutional draft on February 21,
1901 . This document is similar to most constitutions written in the
nineteenth century because its text is long and detailed.' Articles III
and IV contain several liberal provisions designed to protect the eco-
nomic rights of domestic and foreign entities." Article In also creates
an explicit right to free primary and vocational education.7 Addition-
ally, this constitution resembles the United States Constitution in that
legal claims to Cuba).
65. See PREz, BETWEEN REFORM, supra note 27, at 179 (stating the United
States' justifications for limiting political power on the island).
66. See Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. I, 30 Stat. 1754, reprint-
ed in Rodriguez, supra note 10, at 111 (declaring that "Spain relinquishes all claim
of sovereignty over and title to Cuba . . . [a]nd . . . the United States will . . . as-
sume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the
fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property"). The statute and treaty
reinforced Cuba's legal status as a United States protectorate. See CONSTITUCI6N DE
CUBA, Military Order No. 181, May 20, 1902 [hereinafter 1901 CONST.J appendix art.
III, reprinted in Rodriguez, 2 INT'L BUREAU OF THE AM. REPUBS., AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONS 112 (Jos6 Ignacio Rodriguez trans. 1907) [hereinafter Rodriguez, CONST.]
at 149, 153 (stating the United States may intervene in Cuba to protect the national
order); Treaty of Permanent Reciprocity, May 22, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, 21 Stat. 897-98
(ratifying the Platt Amendment as an official treaty).
67. See AZICRI, supra note 26, at 17 (citing Juan Gualberto G6mez, a colleague
and friend of Martf, who claimed that Washington's influence over Cuban affairs, as
formalized by the Platt Amendment and contained in the 1901 Cuban Constitution,
caused Cubans to view their national independence and sovereignty as an illusory
goal).
68. De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 7.
69. See 1901 CONST., reprinted in Rodriguez, CONST., supra note 66 (containing
14 titles, 115 articles, 4 transitional provisions and the Platt Amendment).
70. Id. at 114, 119. These provisions stipulate that foreigners residing in Cuba
shall enjoy the same legal protection as Cuban citizens (art. 10(1)); the government
shall not deprive an individual of his or her property without proper cause and in-
demnification (art. 32); and the government shall not impose the penalty of confis-
cation of property under any circumstances (art. 33). Id.
71. See id. at 118 (guaranteeing that the state will provide free primary and vo-
cational education).
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both documents contain similar provisions regarding basic divisions of
power and political rights3
Because the drafting process of the 1901 Constitution occurred during
the American occupation of the island, the United States military gover-
nor effectuated the new constitution.' In order to retain American in-
fluence on the island, the United States Congress proposed the Platt
Amendment to that document, named for Senator Orville H. Platt, which
stipulated among other things that the United States could intervene into
the domestic affairs of Cuba in order to maintain Cuban independence,
individual rights, or the obligations created under the Treaty of Paris.7! '
On March 2, 1901, United States President William McKinley signed
into law an Army Appropriation Act which included the Platt Amend-
ment75 On June 12 of the same year, the Cuban Constitutional Assem-
bly, after failed attempts to persuade the United States to revise the
Amendment, approved the Platt Amendment as an appendix to the Cu-
ban Constitution.76
Article 40 of the 1901 Constitution set a dangerous precedent for
Cuban constitutional law by permitting suspension of individual rights in
the event of a declared national emergency.' For example, under au-
thority of this provision and Article HI of the Platt Amendment, the
United States and Cuban Governments suspended constitutional rights in
72. See id. arts. 11-90, at 115-137 (establishing a bicameral legislature (art. 44),
a President (art. 64), and an independent judiciary (art. 81), while guaranteeing the
freedom of speech (art. 25), religion (art. 26). and assembly (art. 28)).
73. D'Zurilla, supra note 9, n. 8, at 1224.
74. 1901 CONST. appendix art. mI, reprinted in Rodriguez, CONST., supra note
66, at 153; D'Zurilla, supra note 9, nA, at 1233; Platt Amendment, CUBA READER:
THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY 30 (Philip Brenner et al. eds., 1989)
[hereinafter CUBA READER]; AzicRl, supra note 26, at 16-17.
75. De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 7.
76. Id.
77. 1901 CONST. art. 40, reprinted in Rodriguez, CoNsT., supra note 66, at 120.
This article declares:
The guarantees established in articles 15 [no unlawful detentions], 16 [arrestees
to be placed before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest], 17 (arrests to be
terminated or turned into formal imprisonments within 72 hours of judicial ap-
pearance], 19 [no ex post facto prosecutions], 22 [secrecy of correspondence],
23 [inviolability of domicile], 24 [freedom of domicile] and 27 [right to petition
authorities], section first of this title, shall not be suspended either in the whole
Republic, or in any part thereof, except temporarily and when the safety of the
state may require it, in cases of invasion of the territory or of serious distur-
bances that may threaten public peace.
Id
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1906-1909, 1912, and 1917 to protect political stability on the island. 8
Because the Cuban Government invoked these "emergency provisions"
frequently, Cuban citizens seriously questioned the significance of their
constitutional rights. 9
As Cuban Governments enforced the 1901 Constitution with increas-
ing inconsistency in the decades following its creation, people from both
Cuba and the United States began to doubt the existence of any legiti-
mate constitutional rule."0 Even though their standard of living began to
improve considerably, the political instability that shortened the life
expectancy of any socioeconomic advances created a sense of dissatis-
faction with the overall status of individual rights on the island.8" Dur-
ing these years of considerable turbulence, political and academic leaders
actively began to explore ways to formalize a national, social, and eco-
nomic commitment.8 2 The persistent efforts of these individuals created
popular support for the creation of a new constitution that would reflect
the progressive values of its citizens.8 3
78. PAREZ, BETWEEN REFORM, supra note 27, at 226; De ]a Cuesta, timeline,
supra note 19, at 8-9. These interventions fueled the perception that, under the Platt
Amendment, Cuban leaders could not provide a stable political or legal regime. See
Louis A. PtREZ, JR., INTERVENTION, REVOLUTION, AND POLITICS IN CUBA: 1913-
1921, at xiii (1978) (noting that the United States interventions hindered as much as
it enhanced stability on the island).
79. See DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 18 (suggesting that United States inter-
ventions seriously threatened Cuba's ability to exert political control over its inhabit-
ants).
80. Id. at 19.
81. See id. at 18 (suggesting that, due to unsuccessful efforts to achieve political
independence, Cuban citizens did not trust the United States Government "[d]espite
major improvements in health, education, sanitation, public administration, economics,
and finance achieved under U.S. tutelage").
82. See PREZ, BETWEEN REFORM, supra note 27, at 236-37 (noting that student
and intellectual leaders led the reform movement by calling for a "re-examination of
national values" that would incorporate social advances in agriculture, education, and
industry). The working class, which became larger, vocal and more organized during
these years, also made strong demands for social and economic equality. See id. at
242 (noting that around 1920 the labor unions conducted frequent work stoppages,
boycotts, and strikes throughout Cuba in order to secure higher wages, maximum
work hours, and improved working conditions).
83. See DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 27 (explaining that during the 1930s,
Cubans created several political organizations to legitimize and institutionalize social
and economic reforms).
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F. THE 1940 CONSTITUTION
After a series of United States interventions, Cubans renewed their
hope for political stability and social commitment in 1924 when they
elected, Gerardo Machado to the Cuban presidency on his promise of
economic and social reform.' Machado's promises for substantial re-
form proved to be irrelevant and illusory, however, when in 1928 he
forced through the subservient Cuban Congress a constitutional amend-
ment which called for six-year Presidential terms.' After taking this
action, Machado secured victory in an uncontested and allegedly uncon-
stitutional reelection, began a brutal dictatorship, and quashed Cuba's
prospect for instituting a stable political or legal regime. '
Under threat of intervention from the United States and desertion by
the Cuban army, Machado resigned one year before his term expired
and fled Cuba in August 1933.' At the suggestion of the United States
ambassador, Cuban officials approved Carlos M. de Cespedes, Jr., whose
father was the author of the Grito de Yam and sponsor of the Guimaro
Constitution, to succeed Machado and restore the 1901 Constitution.8s
Because his rise to power resulted from his neutrality and family name,
and not from his level of political experience, de C~spedes could not
organize an effective government coalition.'
The following month, a group of Cuban Army officers led by
Fulgencio Batista staged a coup that overthrew de C~spedes.' Batista's
84. See Louis A. PAREZ, JR., CUBA UNDER THE PLAIr AhNDMENr: 1902-1934
258 (1986) [hereinafter PtREZ, CUBA UNDER PLAIT] (noting that Machado's Platform
of Regeneration was based on a pledge to end political corruption and a commitment
to create new social services and public facilities).
85. DEL AGUI.A, supra note 22, at 20; De la Cuesta, timelinc, supra note 19, at
9.
86. See generally PtR&, CUBA UNDER PLATF, supra note 84, at 278-90 (sug-
gesting that Machado used fraudulent practices to win the 1928 election and that after
his victory, Machado ruled Cuba as a totalitarian leader).
87. De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 9.
88. See PtREZ, CUBA UNDER PLATr, supra note 84, at 317 (stating that the Unit-
ed States Ambassador effectively had unlimited discretion to select a new Cuban
president).
89. See Luis E. AGUI.AR, CUBA 1933: PROLOGUE To REvoLUTION 153 (1972)
(stating that C6spedes lacked the leadership skills needed to overcome Cuba's difficult
situation); PAREZ, CUBA UNDER PLATT, supra note 84, at 317 (stating that Cdspedes
did not receive an endorsement from either the Cuban political elite or the general
population).
90. See De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 9 (indicating that the coup oc-
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movement originally constituted a mere outcry against reductions in the
national defense budget and in no way represented an organized plea for
social or economic change.9 Once installed, however, the 1933 Revolu-
tion gained support from other anti-Machado and anti-United States
forces that wanted to revive Cuban nationalism by strengthening politi-
cal-economic sovereignty and social commitment.'
The revolutionary government soon adopted an agenda designed to
promote full political independence and comprehensive social and eco-
nomic rights.9" Within the initial days of its administration, the revolu-
tionary government officially abrogated the Platt Amendment.' The
new government, largely through decrees issued by Interior Minister
Antonio Guiteras, also initiated reforms establishing eight-hour work
days (Decree No. 1693), cutting utility rates by forty percent, requiring
a minimum of fifty percent Cuban labor in local industries (Decree No.
2583), granting peasants permanent ownership rights to their land, and
placing limits on foreign investor land holdings.95 These decrees were
established, in the words of President Ram6n Grau San Martfn, to create
a "Cuba for the Cubans.
96
Between 1933 and 1939, Batista effectively ruled the country by
overpowering a series of politically handicapped Presidents whom he
replaced whenever they refused to agree with his recommendationsY In
1939, Batista attempted to improve relations with the international com-
munity by permitting Cubans to elect delegates for a new constitutional
curred on September 4, 1933); DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 22 (noting that Batista
led the coup).
91. See DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 22 (explaining that Batista organized his
forces to protest the reductions in the size and budget of the Cuban military that
C~spedes promulgated upon Machado's departure).
92. See id. at 22-23 (noting that the 1933 Revolution incorporated the efforts of
many students, nationalists, and communists who opposed the Machado regime).
93. See AGUILAR, supra note 89, at 171 (stating that Ram6n Grau San Martin,
the first president of the post-revolutionary republic, dedicated his life to nationalism,
socialism, and anti-imperialism, which he believed to be the three main themes of the
revolutionary agenda).
94. De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 9; AGUILAR, supra note 89, at 174.
95. AGUILAR, supra note 89, at 174; DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 22; P9REz,
CUBA UNDER PLATr, supra note 84, at 322.
96. AGUILAR, supra note 89, at 175; PREZ, CUBA UNDER PLATr, supra note 84,
at 322.
97. See De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 10 (indicating that Batista
forced President Grau from office in 1934 and President Miguel Mariamo G6mez
from office in 1936).
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assembly that would consolidate and formalize the gains which the revo-
lutionary government achieved." Cubans challenged Batista to imple-
ment a new constitution, and he met this challenge on July 5, 1940,
when he promulgated a new constitution after winning the Cuban Presi-
dency.99
Social and economic guarantees occupy a dominant position in both
the text and the tenor of the 1940 Constitution.t" Of the 286 Articles
in the document, fifty-four deal exclusively with social and economic
rights.' 1 In several provisions, the document raises to constitutional
status rights that other countries provide only by statute.Ia In other
provisions, the document recognizes rights with a level of specificity
that most countries do not include even in their normal statutes.1m The
Communist representatives to this Assembly believed that these guaran-
tees constituted inalienable rights which the government should not deny
to any person under any circumstance. 0 Other delegates believed that,
due to the perceived weakness and/or disloyalty of previous Cuban lead-
98. See DEL AGUU-A, supra note 22, at 28.
99. IRwiN F. GELLmAN, ROOsEvELT AND BATISTA: GOOD NEIGHBOR DIPLOMACY
IN CUBA 1933-1945, at 183 (1973); DEL AGUIMA. supra note 22, at 29; KREZ, BE-
TwEEN REFORi, supra note 27, at 282.
100. See JORGE DE LA FUENTE, ANALISIS CONSTITUCIONAL DESDE JIIAGUAY0
HASTA EL 40 149-50 (1989) (summarizing the provisions of the 1940 Constitution).
101. 1940 CONST. arts. 24, 43-96, translated in PEASLEF, supra note 11, at 614-
27.
102. 1940 CONST. arts. 48-51, 60-79, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 11, at
614-27. Title V creates extensive and fully subsidized primary, vocational and adult
education systems. Id. arts. 48-52. Title VI provides Cubans with the right to employ-
ment and minimal work benefits. ld. arts. 60-79.
103. Id. at 618-626. Article 43 states that alimony and child care payments "shall
enjoy preference over every other obligation and against that preference no plea can
be made of exemption of property, salary, pension or economic income of any kind."
Id. Article 52 mandates that "[tlhe budget of the ministry of education shall not be
less than the ordinary budget of any other ministry, except in case of an emergency
declared by law" and that the "monthly salary of a primary teacher must not in any
case be less than one-millionth of the total budget of the Nation." Id. Article 91 fur-
ther states that "[t]he head of a family who inhabits, cultivates, and directly exploits
a rural property owned by him, provided the value of it is not more than two thou-
sand dollars, can irrevocably declare it to be family property, to the extent that this
is indispensable for his residence and subsistence, and it shall be exempt from taxes
and shall be unattachable and inalienable except for liabilities prior to this Constitu-
tion." Id.
104. See DE LA FUENTE, supra note 100, at 166 (stating that Communist delegates
encouraged the Assembly to create a constitution without any social or economic divi-
sions) (author's translation).
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ers, a new constitution should compel the national executive to under-
take certain activities and to refrain from engaging in other
activities."3 Yet despite these differences, delegates to the Assembly
worked towards the common goal of protecting social and economic
rights.' 06
Many Cubans, both then and now, view the creation of the 1940
Constitution as one of the most distinguished moments in Cuban histo-
ry." 7 It was the first Cuban national charter created by a diverse repre-
sentation of the population without any influence from a foreign na-
tion.'0 8 Because this document required the government to spend vast
amounts of scarce financial resources, however, Cuban leaders found it
extremely difficult to honor constitutional guarantees and to promote a
prosperous nation simultaneously."° Consequently, many leaders ig-
nored these rights and Batista formally suspended the entire 1940 Con-
stitution between 1952 and 1954." ° Administration of the relevant con-
stitutional provisions was therefore inconsistent at best, and many Cuban
citizens considered their social and economic rights during the Batista
years to be legitimate but unenforceable."'
105. See GELLMAN, supra note 99, at 181 (stating that the fear of presidential
discretion and authority resulted in the creation of autonomous legislative and judicial
branches and the limitation of Presidential terms to four years with reelection only
after an eight year hiatus).
106. See DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 29.
107. See PIREZ, BETWEEN REFORM, supra note 27, at 282 (stating that this docu-
ment created a sense of political and legal legitimacy that permeated Cuban society
for many years); De Ia Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 11 (same).
108. See DE LA FuENTE, supra note 100, at 152-54 (recognizing that the 76 dele-
gates to the Constitutional Assembly included 17 members of the Liberal Party, 17
members of the Aut6ntico Party, 15 members of the Democratic-Republican Party, 9
members of the Nationalist Union Party, 6 members of the Communist Party, and
several delegates from smaller parties, but no foreigners); PREz, BETWEEN REFORM,
supra note 27, at 281 (noting that representatives of all political affiliations attended
the Constitutional Assembly).
109. See DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 29 (stating that social and economic
guarantees under the 1940 Constitution became "illusory goals" because the govern-
ment neglected to enforce its laws consistently and because Cuba's dependent econo-
my restricted the capacity to subsidize extensive social services).
110. De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 12.
I11. See DEL AGUILA, supra note 22, at 31-32 (noting that the ineffectiveness and
disloyalty of public officials led to widespread skepticism towards governmental au-
thority).
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G. CASTRO'S 1976 SOCIALST CONSTITUTION
During the early 1950's Fidel Castro, a young lawyer, ardent national-
ist, and former student agitator, was extremely vocal in expressing his
hostility towards the Batista government."' Castro's rise to popularity
in the 1950's occurred largely because he presented his movement to the
Cuban people as the legitimate heir of the 1933 Revolution and the
1940 Constitution."' In a famous speech given to defend himself at
trial for his assault on Batista's military barracks, Castro made an im-
passioned plea for fulfilling Cuba's social and economic goals."' After
his rebel movement solidified several years later, Castro formally de-
clared that his movement "foresees the establishment of an order in
which all the inalienable rights of a human being-political, social,
economic, and cultural-will be fully met and guaranteed.""'
When Castro overthrew Batista in 1959, he quickly proclaimed a
Fundamental Law that effectively replaced the existing constitution."6
This document consolidated political power from the three branches of
the former Cuban Government into a central authority and removed
112. See THOMS E. SKIDMORE AND PETER H. SMrrH. MODERN LATiN AEmECA
257 (2d ed. 1989) (tracing Castro's history of dissent against the Batista government).
113. D'Zurilla, supra note 9, at 1239.
114. See Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me, reprinted in CUBA READER, supra
note 74, at 32. In this speech, Castro used several statistics to indicate that the
Batista government was not fulfilling the guarantees of the 1940 Constitution and the
nation needed a new government to perform the task:
In terms of struggle .... we're talking about the six hundred thousand Cubans
without work, .. .the five hundred thousand farm laborers who live in misera-
ble shacks .... the four hundred thousand industrial workers and laborers
whose retirement funds have been embezzled, the one hundred thousand small
farmers who live and die working land that is not theirs ...The problem of
land, the problem of industrialization, the problem of housing, the problem of
unemployment, the problem of education and the problem of people's health:
these are the six problems we would take immediate steps to solve.
Id.
115. Program Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement (November 1956). translat-
ed in CUBA READER, supra note 74, at 36.
116. De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 12. While the Fundamental law
resulted in substantial changes in the distribution of political power and rights, Castro
claimed that the statute was a mere amendment to the 1940 Constitution. D'Zurilla,
supra note 9, at 1239.
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many civil and political rights previously guaranteed to all Cubans."'
The social and economic guarantees mandated by the 1940 Constitution,
however, remained essentially unchanged by the Fundamental Law.'
Between 1959 and 1976, Castro amended the Fundamental Law sever-
al times to strengthen state control and reduce individual political
rights."9 Because Cuba appeared to lack a permanent and tangible
constitutional regime, Castro appointed a commission in October 1974 to
prepare a socialist constitution that would embody the goals of his revo-
lution. 2 In February 1975, the First Congress of the Cuban Commu-
nist Party approved the commission draft by an overwhelming majority
and Castro promulgated the new constitution in the beginning of the
following year.'
The social and economic provisions of the 1976 Constitution, and
indeed the entire document itself, are couched in the rhetoric of Marxist-
Leninist philosophy." 2 The 1976 Constitution exceeds the social provi-
sions of the 1940 Constitution by providing all Cuban citizens with the
right to free physical education and medical and dental care.'23 The
charter further guarantees a national interest in housing and environmen-
117. D'Zurilla, supra note 9, at 1239.
118. LEY FUNDAMENTAL DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA, GACETA OFICIAL, arts. 20-
96, Feb. 7, 1959, reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF CUBA 1959 6-26 (Pan Ameri-
can Union translation).
119. See De la Cuesta, timeline, supra note 19, at 13 (noting that in the years
following the promulgation of the Fundamental Law, the Cuban Government modified
this document nineteen times in order to deprive all rights to citizens who opposed
the Castro regime).
120. D'Zurilla, supra note 9, at 1242-43.
121. Id.
122. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPJBLICA DE CUBA, Gaceta Oficial, Feb. 24, 1976
[hereinafter 1976 CONsT.], translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Leonel De La Cuesta, trans.) (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, eds.,
1976) [hereinafter De la Cuesta, CONST.]. The Preamble states that the citizens of
Cuba are the "heirs and continuators of the creative work and traditions of those . . .
who spread socialist ideas and founded the first Marxist and Marxist-Leninist move-
ments." Id. Chapter One states that "The Republic of Cuba is a socialist state of
workers and peasants and all other manual and intellectual workers," id. art. 1, and
endorses the modified Marxist principle of "from each according to his ability to each
according to his work." Id. art. 19.
123. Id. at 13-14. Chapter Six provides for all Cubans free medical care, hospital
care, rural medical service networks, specialized treatment centers, regular medical
examinations, free dental care, and vaccinations. Id. art. 49. This chapter further pro-
vides that all Cuban citizens have the right to physical education, sports and recre-
ation. Id. art. 51.
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tal cleanliness. 4 At the same time, however, the 1976 charter limits
economic rights contained in the 1940 Constitution by granting to the
state ownership of almost all real property and by prohibiting labor
unions that are not organized by the state. " Although social and eco-
nomic rights granted under this constitution are explicit, the document is
in no way based upon these provisions, as is evidenced by the fact that
only twenty-two of 141 articles grant rights of this nature to the Cuban
people. 12
H. THE 1992 CONSTrITTON
During the 1970s and early 1980s, Castro appeared able to fulfill
many guarantees contained in the 1976 charter.'" This was due in
124. I& at 4-8. Chapter One stipulates that the state will work "to achieve that no
family be left without a comfortable place to live." Id. art. 8(c). This Chapter further
states that the states and individual citizens must share responsibility "to watch over
the cleanliness of the waters and of the air, and to protect the flora and the fauna."
Id art. 27.
125. Id at 6-14. Chapter One states that "all the people" own the entire means of
production. Id. art. 14. This chapter also states that "[tlhe law regulates the right of
citizens to inherit legal title to a place of residence and to other personal goods and
chattels" (art. 24), and that "expropriation of property for reasons of public benefit or
social interest and with due compensation is authorized" (art. 25). Id. Chapter Six
holds that work "is a right and duty and a source of pride for every citizen." Id. art.
44. Because work is transformed from a right into a duty, Cuban citizens under this
charter lose the ability to strike or to engage in collective bargaining. D'Zurilla, supra
note 9, at 1251-52. Furthermore, because the state is virtually the only employer on
the island and because only official unions are permitted, worker unions do not serve
the same purpose that Western unions do. 1976 CONST. art. 53, translated in De la
Cuesta, CONST., supra note 122, at 14; see also Organization of American States, In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights in Cuba, in CUBA READ-
ER, supra note 74, at 233 (noting that labor unions in Cuba, which once served
worker's interests, now serve as instruments of government control).
126. 1976 CONST. arts. 8, 19-27, 38-39, 42-51, translated in De la Cuesta. CoNs'r.,
supra note 122, at 3-14. Article 8 addresses duties of the state, Articles 19-27 address
property ownership, Articles 38-39 address education and culture, Articles 42-43 ad-
dress equality of rights, and Articles 44-51 address fundamental rights, duties and
guarantees. Id.
127. See generally, Robert N. Ubell, Twenty-Five Years of Cuban Health Care. re-
printed in CUBA READER, supra note 74, at 435 (noting that Castro has successfully
honored his obligation to provide free and full medical care for all Cubans). Cuba
under the first years of the Castro government also made tremendous advances in
education. Marvin Leiner, Cuba's Schools: 25 Years Later, reprinted in CUBA READ-
ER, supra note 74, at 447-48. Castro further made notable advancements in employ-
ment. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Socioeconomic Performance of Cuba. in CUBAN
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large part to a huge annual foreign assistance package from the former
Soviet Union."2 In 1989, when the communist bloc disintegrated and
the Soviets cancelled Castro's subsidy, however, Cuba's ability to pro-
vide for the welfare of its citizens declined dramatically. 9 Without
favorable trade agreements with socialist nations, 3 and with the immi-
nent tightening of a trade embargo by Western countries, 3 ' Cuba's so-
cial and economic condition plunged into what Castro euphemistically
called a "special period."'3
In order to maintain control over the island, Castro chose to make
only those reforms which he believed were absolutely necessary to pre-
serve the existing order. 3 As part of this effort, Castro guided
CoMMuNISM 13, 28 (Irving L. Horowitz, ed., 1984) [hereinafter Mesa-Lago, Socioeco-
nomic Performance] (stating that Cuba had reached virtually full employment in
1970).
128. See Ron Howell, System Failing Where It Hurts; Cuban Health Care Suffers,
NEWSDAY, May 16, 1993, at 38 [hereinafter Howell, System Failing] (noting that
Cuba's annual subsidy from the former Soviet Union, which amounted to approxi-
mately four billion dollars, enabled the government to finance extensive social service
programs).
129. See Ron Howell, Socialism Plowing On In Cuba, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 1992,
at 17 [hereinafter Howell, Socialism Plowing On] (noting that the elimination of trade
agreements with the former Soviet Union and its former East European allies caused
widespread shortages of food, raw materials and spare parts that have crippled the
nation); C. Elizabeth Espin, Fourth Communist Party Congress Issues Invitation to
Foreign Capitalist Investors, FREE-MARKET CUBA Bus. J. (Winter 1992), at I (same)
(on file with the law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge); Making the Best
of Cuba's Bad Job, ECONOMIST, Jan. 26, 1991, at 37 [hereinafter Making the Best]
(same); Preeg, supra note 1, at 5 (same).
130. Howell, Socialism Plowing On, supra note 129, at 17.
131. See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, § 1706, 22 U.S.C. (section) 6005 (Supp.
1992) (prohibiting vessels that dock in Cuba from entering United States territory
within 180 days of departure from Cuba and prohibiting subsidiaries of United States
firms from doing business in Cuba).
132. See Phil Davison, Cubans Get on Their Bikes to Beat Fuel Shortage, INDE-
PENDENT, Sept. 15, 1993, at 15 (noting that Castro used the term "special period" to
refer to economic crisis); Ricardo Chavira and David Marcus, Cuba: Communist
Dream on the Brink of Disaster, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 29, 1993, at A5 (stating
that Castro's so-called "special period" involved several measures that quickly and
dramatically reduced Cuban living standards).
133. See Ricardo Chavira, To Risk It All: Cuba's Need For Economic Reform
Poses Dilemma For Castro, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 20, 1993, at IA (stating
that Castro's recent mixed-market reforms are limited to those measures absolutely
necessary to ensure the survival of the Castro government); Jorge I. Dominguez, The
Secrets of Castro's Staying Power, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1993, at 97, 99 (noting
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through the legislature a new constitution which further consolidated his
executive powers and revised all references to friendly relations with the
former Soviet empire.1  Although the social and economic provisions
of the 1992 Constitution are almost identical to those of the 1976 Con-
stitution, numerous reports both within and outside Cuba indicate that
Castro simply cannot honor all his constitutional commitments under
Cuba's current state of virtual autarky.135
The 1992 Constitution grants some minor economic rights in the form
of limited property ownership." On the other hand, this document re-
that Castro has made "minimal" political reforms); Gunn, supra note 1, at 2 (noting
that in September 1993, the Cuban government, as a matter of economic necessity.
promulgated Decree-Law 141 which provides limited free-enterprise initiatives, but
only to Cubans who do not hold university degrees); ANDRES OPPENHEIMIER
CAsTRo'S FINAL HOUR: THE SEcRET STORY BEHIND THE COMING DOWNFALL OF
COMI.JNIST CUBA 366 (1992) (citing Jiri Valenta, a renowned Cuban studies expert.
who stated that Castro failed to implement substantial political or economic reforms).
134. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA, Sept. 22, 1992 [hereinafter 1992
CoNsT.], translated in Foreign Broadcasters Information Service, TEXT OF NEw CU-
BAN CONSTTUTION (1992) [hereinafter FBIS]. The language from the preamble of the
1976 Constitution, recognizing Cuba's friendship with the Soviet Union, was replaced
with a new preambulatory clause stating that Cuba is supported "by proletarian inter-
nationalism, and by the fraternal friendship, aid, cooperation, and solidarity of the
peoples of the world, especially those of Latin America and the Caribbean" Id. at 1.
135. See UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CUBA: HANDBOOK OF
TRADE STATISTICS 9 (1992) (stating that the Cuban economy shrank drastically during
the early 1990s). Cuba's composition of trade from 1986 to 1991 (in millions of dol-
lars) was:
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
exports 6,439 5,402 5,518 5,392 4,910 . 3,585
imports 9,191 7,584 7,580 8,124 6.745 3,690
deficit 2,752 2,182 2,062 2,732 1,835 105
IL; see also Howell, System Failing, supra note 128, at 38 (noting that, due to the
loss of favorable trade agreements and the embargo of necessary supplies, Cubans
have witnessed a sharp reduction in health care services and a sharp increase in the
incidence of malnutrition and disease); Johanna McGeary and Cathy Booth, Cuba
Alone, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 42, 45 (stating that a reduction in imports from S8
billion to $1.7 billion since the fall of the Soviet empire has forced Cuba to revise
its socialist program).
136. 1992 CONST. art. 24, translated in FBIS, supra note 134, at 4. This provi-
sion recognizes the "right to inheritance of the individually owned dwelling, and of
other personally owned assets." Id. art. 24(1). Article 24 further states that small
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stricts several economic rights by making more explicit the state's right
to own all property and each Cuban's duty to work and serve the
state. "'37 Regardless of these changes to the 1976 charter, the most
noteworthy provision of the new constitution is Article 67 which allows
the executive to suspend any or all constitutional provisions indefinitely
and replace them with any regulations he or she deems appropriate.'
Given the tenuous state of national affairs in the 1990s, Article 67 ef-
fectively has placed Cuban constitutional law at the mercy of Fidel Cas-
tro. 1
3 9
H. THE POLITICAL ARGUMENT
A. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNS
Perhaps the most compelling reason to include social and economic
rights in a new constitution is that most Cubans would want them in-
farms are inheritable in certain cases. Id. art. 24(2).
137. Id. at 3-6. Chapter I declares that "The State directly administers the assets
comprising the socialist property of all the people, or may create and organize enter-
prises and entities responsible for their administration." Id. art. 17. Chapter 7 holds
that "[there is recognition for unpaid volunteer work, done for the benefit of the
whole society, in industrial, agricultural, technical, artistic, and service activities, as a
shaper of our people's communist conscience." Id. art. 45(3).
138. Id. at 7. Art. 67 states:
In the event, or in view of imminent natural disasters or calamities, or other
circumstances which, by their nature, proportion, or importance, affect the inter-
nal order or security of the country, or the stability of the State, the President
of the Council of State may declare a state of emergency in the entire national
territory, or in a part of it; and, while it is in effect, may order the mobiliza-
tion of the population. The law regulates the manner in which the state of
emergency is declared, its effects, and its termination. It also determines the
fundamental rights and obligations recognized by the Constitution, the exercise
of which must be regulated differently while the state of emergency is in ef-
fect.
Id.
139. See Cuba's New Constitution: Better or Worse?, THE CUBA REPORT, Sept.
1992, at I (recognizing the new political and military powers granted to Castro by
the 1992 Constitution). Despite this broad delegation of authority, one scholar be-
lieves that Article 67 may actually benefit the Cuban government in its anticipated
transition to a market economy. See Jorge I. Dominguez, The Transition to Some-
where: Cuba In the 1990s, in The Cuban Research Institute, TRANSITION IN CUBA:
NEW CHALLENGES FOR U.S. POLICY 5, 25 (Lisandro Pdrez, ed., 1993) (noting that a
new, strong and centralized authority would be better equipped than a new legislature
to wean the Cuban people away from their dependence on social services).
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cluded.'" Recent reports indicate that older Cubans and loyal Fidelistas
want to retain these national commitments in order to further the com-
prehensive social and economic agenda that has evolved since the 1933
Revolution . 4' According to these accounts, Cubans are concerned that
a failure by a new government to recognize existing social and econom-
ic rights would reverse thirty-five years of progress in education and
health care.
42
These reports further indicate that younger Cubans, born after the
1959 Revolution, favor social and economic rights because they want to
retain the panoply of benefits that the government always has provided
for them.43 Many Cubans in this generation believe that Cuba should
pursue market-oriented prosperity but not at the expense of social privi-
leges to which they are accustomed.'" Although they use different rea-
140. See McGeary & Booth, supra note 135, at 48 (stating that millions of Cu-
bans who had few if any social and economic rights before the revolution are "fierce-
ly proud" of their health care, education and social security benefits and are commit-
ted to retaining these guarantees).
141. See id. at 45 (noting that most Cubans want their government to preserve
current social and economic rights because they believe these guarantees are too valu-
able to sacrifice); Stan Pankratz, Vast Majority of Cubans Will Refuse to Let Socialist
System Fall, STAR TRim., Sept. 18, 1993, at A23 (stating that the vast majority of
Cubans approve of the nation's current social welfare system). The Cuban Government
continues to demonstrate its belief in continued social and economic commitment by
attempting to honor its constitutional obligations even during the current economic
crisis. Id. at A23; see also Julio Carranza Valds, Reform and the Future of Cuban
Socialism, in THE CUBAN REVOLUTION INTO THE 1990S: CUBAN PERSPEcnVES 11, 14
(Centro de Estudios Sobre America ed. & Clare Weber trans., 1992) (noting that
between 1986 and 1992, expenditures on social security increased 36% and spending
on education and health increased 45%).
142. See Chavira, supra note 133, at IA (citing Wayne Smith, former head of the
U.S. mission in Havana, who stated that Cubans are "cautious" of reforms to the
socialist system because they fear losing their free health care and education benefits);
Making the Best, supra note 129, at 37 (suggesting many people in Cuba today are
willing to sacrifice political reforms in order to retain health and education services).
143. See Janette Habel, Social Crisis, Bureaucratization and Rectification, in CUBA:
THE REVOLUTION IN PERIL 57, 68 (Jon Barnes trans., 1991) (noting that younger
Cubans continue to demand the social services they have always enjoyed as a matter
of birthright); McGeary & Booth, supra note 135, at 48 (stating that a 35 year old
Cuban described his generation as being inextricably attached to the social
achievements of Castro's revolution).
144. Id., at 48. Many young Cubans who call for societal reform envision a new,
mixed economy with both private enterprise and social and economic protections. See
Oppenheimer, supra note 133, at 269 (citing Canek Sanchez Guevara, Che Guevara's
oldest grandchild and a well known Castro critic, who desires to live in a market-
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sons to support their beliefs, most Cubans consider some package of
social and economic rights essential for the construction of any new
Cuban society.'45
Because Cubans past and present have expressed a strong desire for
social and economic protection, future Cuban elites could use the new
national charter to recognize the people's intent.', Several experts
have recognized that, because it is a political document reflecting the
will of its people, the drafters must tailor the constitution to respond to
the individual demands of the nation. "' If post-Castro constitution
drafters support this notion, then they would create a document which
incorporates the Cuban view on social and economic commitments.'48
Beyond granting Cubans what they want in their constitution, the
inclusion of social and economic guarantees in a new constitution could
have additional positive effects on the health and stability of Cuban
society by reducing the rates of crime, drug abuse and social tension on
the island.'49 This statement is based on the simple premise that in so-
cieties where jobs, education, and medical care are relatively easy to
procure, criminal behavior will result more from greed than from
need. 5 International crime statistics support this assertion by demon-
strating that societies providing greater social and economic guarantees
generally have experienced lower rates of drug abuse and crime. 5'
oriented, socially responsive society like Sweden, Switzerland or Belgium).
145. See Boudreaux, Can Castro Weather Storm, supra note 1, at Al (stating that
future Cuban leaders would not overcome political costs which would arise if they
denied their constituents of significant social benefits).
146. See Schwartz, Aiming High, supra note 18, at 28 (noting that the decision of
which items to include in a constitution should be based on the political concerns of
the individual country instead of the theoretical concerns of constitutional experts).
147. See 138 CONG. REc. E3084 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1992) (statement of Prof. Al-
bert Blaustein) (stating that countries should tailor each constitution to reflect the indi-
vidual needs, aspirations, and culture of the society it serves).
148. See Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslova-
kia: E Duobus Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 511, 512 (1991) (stating that societies
write constitutions to express their collective views on the past and to embody their
aspirations for the future); see also Schwartz, Economic and Social Rights, supra note
18, at 551 (same).
149. See Mary Carter-Williams, Jobs Can Curb Crime, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1993, at B5 (referring to several longitudinal studies of crime which indicate that
unemployment, poverty and social discrimination lead to increased homicide rates).
150. See William F. Buckley, Jr., Poverty Not the Cause of Black Crime?, HoJs.
CHRON., Jan. 11, 1993, at A12 (stating that people who become homeless and hungry
also become more likely to steal).
151. See Crime: Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 1993,
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An examination of the experiences of Eastern European nations and
the former Soviet Union demonstrates the increase in crime, drug abuse,
and social friction when a state retreats from social and economic com-
mitments."' During the 1990s, these states experienced markedly in-
creased crime and drug problems in their transition from socialist to
capitalist systems." This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the
new governments do not possess adequate financial or political resources
to deter the spread of drugs and crime." Furthermore, in the case of
the former Soviet republics, the lack of social and economic commit-
ment from the new governments has threatened the political stability of
several nations.'
at 56 (citing a recent international crime survey which reports that in France, Bel-
gium, Finland, Norway and Switzerland, 15% to 20% of the population are victims of
crime whereas in Australia, New Zealand, Holland, Poland, Canada and the United
States, 25% to 30% of the population are victims of crime). The United States,
whose constitution affords relatively little social and economic protection, maintains
one of the highest murder rates in the world. See Bernd Debusmann. U.S. Holds
Lonely Lead in International Murder Statistics, REurER LIBRARY REPORT, Aug. 27,
1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that the overall United
States murder rate is 2.6 to eight times higher than the murder rate in other Western
countries and, in some categories, the United States homicide rate is 70 times higher
than it is in other Western countries); Tom Carter, Life Under Castro: Iron Fist Has-
n't Crushed Cubans' Spirit, WASH. TwIEs, Oct. 28, 1992, at Al (noting that, despite
the rising rate of petty crimes in Cuba, the rate of violent crime is much higher in
the United States than in Cuba).
152. See Aleksander Checko, Crime and Punishment for Eastern Europe's Cops:
Reforms Foster Crime While Police Take the Heat, WORLDPAPER, Oct. 1991, at 12
(providing statistics to demonstrate that the incidence of both property and violent
crimes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria increased dramatically dur-
ing the early 1990s); Ray Moseley, Berlin Wall is Down, But German Crime Up,
Cm. TRiB., July 7, 1991, at 1 (noting that German police officials recorded an in-
crease in violent crime by skinheads and Neo-Nazis in the years following the fall of
the East German Government); Bill Gertz, Crime Syndicates Form East-West Interna-
tional Link, WASH. TiMES, Nov. 22, 1993, at A5 (noting that the crime rate in the
former Soviet bloc rose almost 1,000% during the last half of 1993). Observers al-
ready have noted a correlation between the decrease in social services and the in-
crease in social tensions within Cuba. Mesa-Lago, Social Safety Net, supra note 6, at
602. This trend is likely to become more noticeable as the economic crisis on the
island intensifies. ld at 602.
153. Checko, supra note 152, at 12; Gertz, supra note 152, at A5.
154. See Checko, supra note 152, at 12 (stating that East European police are
understaffed and ill-equipped to handle the increased level and more sophisticated
forms of crime); Moseley, supra note 152, at I (noting the same phenomenon for
police officers in East Germany).
155. See Checko, supra note 152, at 12 (stating that violent, well organized gangs
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Similar to the increase in crime rates and drug abuse caused by the
failure to create social and economic guarantees, the failure to deliver
social and economic guarantees can lead to the same result.'56 In the
case of Cuba, the government's recent inability to implement fully its
social welfare programs'57 coincides with a significant increase in
crime and drug usage.' If current trends continue, further deprivation
of social or economic rights will likely lead to more and more serious
crime and drug problems.'59
Critics of expansive constitutional guarantees might suggest that Cuba
can and should address its social ills without raising any social or eco-
nomic rights to the level of constitutional promises." Advocates of
social and economic rights could counter this proposition, however, by
noting that Cuba, as a small state with less developed political institu-
tions, does not possess the amount of time and resources needed to
cultivate these rights as a legally significant element of society. 6' Pro-
ponents of the latter view, which include a majority of post-socialist
government constitution drafters, fear that if essential social and eco-
recently established in the former Soviet republics have exported illegal drugs and
arms, embezzled millions of rubles from the state treasury, and murdered several vic-
tims).
156. See Richard A. Epstein, Drafting A Constitution: A Friendly Warning to
South Africa, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y, 567, 570 (1992/1993) (linking the
demise of the former Soviet Union with Moscow's failure to deliver social and eco-
nomic promises contained in the Soviet constitution).
157. See McGeary & Booth, supra note 135, at 44 (suggesting that the Cuban
government in 1993 continues to offer adequate education and health care but fails to
provide an adequate food supply).
158. See Richard Boudreaux, Crime Soaring In Cuba As Fidel Castro's Socialist
Economy Is Caught In Free Fall, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1991, at 22 [hereinafter
Boudreaux, Crime Soaring] (noting that the rate of murders and violent crimes in
Cuba increased 42% between 1989 and 1991 and the rate of theft increased 63% in
1990).
159. See id. (suggesting that if Cuba's social safety net were to disintegrate, the
nation would witness greatly increased rates of violent crime and drug trafficking as
experienced by Jamaica and Columbia).
160. See Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, supra note 17, at 36 (stating that con-
stitution drafters who attempt to incorporate all their societal aspirations into a nation-
al charter run the risk of creating an ineffective document with no legal or practical
value).
161. See Schwartz, Economic and Social Rights, supra note 18, at 561 (suggesting
that countries without well established political and judicial institutions can benefit
greatly by creating longer, more detailed constitutions that determine the authority and
purpose of each branch of government).
162. See supra note 13 (recognizing that all of the nine listed post-socialist consti-
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nomic guarantees are not created in the new constitution, the legislature
may fail to create them, the executive may fail to enforce them, and the
judiciary may be powerless to uphold them." If the latter view is in-
deed accurate, then branches within the new Cuban Government can act
immediately and completely to fulfill their social and economic mandate
only if the constitution clearly establishes the structure and the function
of the entire government."6
B. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONCERNS
Another political reason why Cuba should include social and econom-
ic rights in its post-Castro constitution is that several treaties of the
United Nations and the Organization of American States recognize these
guarantees as fundamental components of society." Some treaty provi-
sions promote social and economic commitments in the abstract"
whereas other treaties outline specific promises for each state to
make." In either case, the language of most of these treaties suggest
that economic and social guarantees are a fundamental component of the
undeniable individual rights of all people."6
tutions stipulate some form of social and economic rights).
163. See Schwartz, Economic and Social Rights, supra note 18. at 561 (noting that
governmental institutions in new democracies may not have sufficient power in the
years immediately following their creation to effectuate short andlor vague constitu-
tional guarantees).
164. Id.
165. See Declaration, infra note 166, art 22 at 355 (declaring that individuals pos-
sess inalienable social and economic rights); Covenant, infra note 167, arts. 6-13 at
378-80 (same); Convention, infra note 179, art. 26 at 459 (same); Protocol Preamble,
infra note 183, at 161 (same).
166. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, art. 22, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Declaration], reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW SELEcrED Documawrs, 352, 355 (Barry E Carter & Phillip R.
Trimble, eds., 1991) [hereinafter Carter & Trimble] (declaring that "[e]veryone as a mem-
ber of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national
effort and international cooperation in accordance with the organization and resources of
each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the
free development of his personality").
167. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966). entry into force Mar. 23, 1976 [here-
inafter Covenant], reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 166, at 376, 381 (man-
dating in article 14 that nations which cannot provide free, universal and compulsory
education at the primary level within two years of signing the Covenant must submit
a detailed plan outlining their plans to do so).
168. See Covenant Preamble, reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 166, at
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United
Nations in 1948,"6 is the most significant product of that
organization's effort to define and protect indispensable natural
rights. 0 This treaty mandates that member states explicitly recognize,
and undertake affirmative measures to protect, universal rights to social
security and education.' The Declaration also holds that all member
states agree to recognize rights to property ownership, work, and lei-
sure.' Because Cuba voted in favor of the Declaration,' it current-
ly maintains a legal commitment to fulfill the obligations contained
therein. 17
4
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted by the United Nations in 1966,"' is the universally accepted
treaty on social and economic rights.7 6 The Covenant declares that
parties to the treaty must recognize universal rights to work, education,
social security, physical and mental health, and favorable working con-
376 (stating that social and economic rights "derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person"); Protocol Preamble, infra note 183, at 162 (stating that social, eco-
nomic and cultural rights combined with civil and political rights create "an indivisi-
ble whole based on the recognition of the dignity of the human person, for which
reason both [sets of rights] require permanent protection and promotion if they are to
be fully realized").
169. Declaration, reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 166, at 352. The gov-
ernments of 48 states voted in favor of the Declaration, no governments voted against
it, and eight states abstained from voting. Id.
170. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 869 (1991).
171. Declaration, reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 166, arts. 22, 26 at
355-56. The Declaration guarantees a universal right to social security. Id. art. 22.
This document also mandates that member states must provide its citizens with educa-
tion that is universal and, at the elementary stages, free and compulsory. Id. art. 26.
172. Id. arts. 17, 23-24, at 354-55. Article 17(1) provides that "[e]veryone has the
right to own property alone as well as in association with others," and art. 17(2)
provides that "[nlo one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Article 23 pro-
vides that "[e]veryone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just
and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment." Id. art.
23(1). Article 24 provides that "[e]veryone has the right to rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitations of working hours and periodic holidays with pay" Id. art. 24.
173. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, BASIC DOcuMENTS IN INTERNATION-
AL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 916 (Bums H. Weston et al. eds., 1990).
174. See Declaration, reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 166, art. 28 at
356 (declaring that each state must provide a social order "in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized").
175. Covenant, supra note 167.
176. See id. (indicating that the 92 parties to the covenant represent virtually every
political and geographical affiliation in the world).
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ditions.'" The Covenant also outlines reporting procedures which all
parties to the agreement must follow in their effort to implement the
aforementioned goals.
The American Convention on Human Rights, signed in 1970 by twen-
ty members of the Organization of American States,'" mandates that
parties to the treaty must adopt individual measures in their own legisla-
tures that are designed to fulfill the social and economic standards im-
plied in the OAS Charter." ° Legal practitioners could attempt to inter-
pret or uphold this provision because the Charter establishes several
identifiable social and economic standards.' Because the Charter treats
these standards as long range aspirations instead of current expectations,
however, the Convention places no tangible legal commitments on rati-
fying states."s
The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, signed in
1988 by thirteen of the original Convention members," provides the
177. Covenant, supra note 167, arts. 6-13.
178. See Covenant, supra note 167, art. 14, 16-17 (mandating in Article 14 that
nations who cannot provide free, universal and compulsory education at the primary
level within two years of signing the Covenant must submit a detailed plan outlining
its plans to do so, and in Articles 16-17 that parties to the Covenant must periodi-
cally submit reports to the UN Secretary-General detailing the successes and failures
they encounter in their efforts to implement the Covenant).
179. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (en-
tered into force on July 18, 1978) [hereinafter Convention], reprinted in Carter &
Trimble, supra note 166, at 451. The 20 parties to the treaty are: Argentina, Barba-
dos, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gre-
nada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua. Panama, Peru, Surina-
me, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id
180. Convention art. 26, reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 166. at 459.
181. See Charter of the Organization of American States (as amended), Apr. 30,
1948, art. 31, 2 U.S.T. 2394; amended effective 1970, 21 U.S.T. 607 (calling upon
states to work towards, among other things, "rapid eradication of illiteracy and expan-
sion of educational opportunities for all" and "adequate housing for all sectors of the
population"). The Charter also declares that states should work towards recognition
and implementation of rights to employment, labor unions and social security. Id. art.
43.
182. See Convention art. 26, reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 166. at
459 (failing to specify the number, nature or timeframe concerning measures nations
should undertake).
183. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Nov. 14, 1988, 28 I.LM. 161. 162
[hereinafter Protocol]. The states that signed the Protocol are Argentina, Bolivia, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico. Nica-
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details on social and economic commitments that are missing from the
original treaty."s This Protocol mandates that parties to the treaty must
recognize universal rights to work, satisfactory working conditions, work
unions and strikes, health care, social security, a clean environment,
food and education.'85 Although the Additional Protocol provides a
clear agenda for social and economic commitment throughout the region,
this treaty will not enter into force until eleven of the signatory states
deposit instruments of ratification or accession with the OAS.'86
Because an overwhelming majority of nations support the shared set
of values and norms contained in the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, Cuba could demonstrate its political
and philosophical alliance with these countries by incorporating the
suggestions of the Covenant into its own constitution. 87 If it were to
do so, Cuba could enhance the legal strength of social and economic
rights both within the country and throughout the world.'88 Further-
more, if Cuba created a legal structure that conforms with the Covenant
or with the Additional Protocol, states within the region might more
easily or more quickly invite Cuba to join local economic organizations
such as the Caribbean Economic Community ("CARICOM") or regional
ragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Id.
184. See Protocol art. 6, supra note 183, at 162 (creating the right to work); id.
art. 7 (creating the right to satisfactory work conditions); id. art. 8, (creating trade
union rights and the right to strike); id. art. 9 (creating the right to social security);
id. art. 10 (creating the right to health); id. art. 11 (creating the right to a healthy
environment); id. art. 12 (creating the right to food); id. art. 13 (creating the right to
education).
185. Id. arts. 6-13. Several of these guarantees provide greater detail than that
which is included in corresponding provisions of the Covenant. See id. art. 9 (guaran-
teeing that social security benefits shall include injury compensation and paid mater-
nity leave programs for all employed citizens); id. art. 10 (guaranteeing that the right
to health care include universal access to immunization against the principal infectious
diseases and health prevention public education programs).
186. Id. art. 21(3). None of the original signatory states ratified the Protocol in
the year they signed the treaty. Id. Nevertheless, regardless of whether or not the
Protocol enters into force, this treaty is valuable as a source of international custom-
ary law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. f
(1987) (stating that unratified treaties are used increasingly as sources of international
customary law).
187. See Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order and Critical Legal
Studies, 42 STAN. L. REv. 811, 835 (1990) (stating that by incorporating recognized
international norms into domestic legislation, states can validate the legitimacy of the
relevant international standards and the strength of international law).
188. Id.
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political organizations such as the Organization of American States
(,,OAS,'). 8 9
m. THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT
The goal for any classical-liberal economic actor is to maximize prof-
it."g The most direct way to achieve this task, according to noted
economists and business executives, is to produce optimally efficient
products, which are defined as those items that create the maximum
output using the minimum amount of resources.' Assuming this theo-
ry is valid, economic actors, both at the macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic level, exercise sound economic judgement when they attempt to
produce high quality, low cost products and services."'
When examined under a cost-benefit analysis, several social and eco-
nomic rights promote the development of high quality and low cost
products. 93 For example, several notable studies demonstrate that ade-
189. See Boris Yopo, Latin American Perspectives on the Cuban Transition, 3
CUBA BRIEFING PAPER SERiEs 4-5 (The Cuba Project, Center for Latin American
Studies, Georgetown Univ. 1993) (noting that Cuba's failure to adopt a political and
legal agenda consistent with that of its neighbors has prevented the island from be-
coming a full partner in the movement towards Latin American economic and politi-
cal cooperation).
190. See EDWiN MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS 119 (5th ed. 1986) (stating that econo-
mists assume maximization of profits as the primary motivation for all businesses).
191. See iL at 507 (explaining the "optimal input decision" principle, as a princi-
ple which shows that economic actors pursue profit by purchasing only those addition-
al inputs to production that generate more revenue than costs).
192. See Michael N. Cantwell, Global Competition: U.S. Industry's Hidden Advan-
tages, INDUSTRY WK., OcL 7, 1991, at 45 (stating that 80% of the respondents in a
survey of 250 owners and chief executive officers of large United States manufactur-
ing companies agreed that high quality leads to high profits).
193. See generally JOE SHERMAN, IN THE RWNGS OF SATURN (1994) (demonstrat-
ing that Saturn Corporation, which provides its employees with comprehensive medi-
cal, education and vacation benefits, produces high quality and low cost automobiles).
During their initial years of production, Saturn employees cut costs and increased
production. See 1d. at 318-19 (noting that in 1992, Saturn reduced its manufacturing
costs by $1,600 per car and increased production to 1,050 cars per day, up from 800
cars per day in 1991). The Saturn labor agreement creates a policy of hiring workers
for life and providing them with a substantial benefits package and a profit-sharing
incentive program. See Saturn Memorandum of Agreement [Saturn MOA] art. 16 (es-
tablishing mandatory training for all Saturn employees) (on file with the Saturn Cor-
poration); id. art. 21 (providing permanent job security to the vast majority of Saturn
employees); id, art. 25 (providing 2-5 weeks annual vacation, depending on an
employee's length of service with Saturn andfor General Motors); id. art. 31 (provid-
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quate health care services can reduce the costs incurred in repairing or
replacing a society's human capital."9 Stated differently, money spent
on preventative health care programs could substantially increase produc-
tivity by reducing health care costs and worker absenteeism.'"3 Interna-
tional statistics also show that a limited national right to health care can
be an economically beneficial proposition. 96
Additional reports indicate that minimal work conditions and vacation
periods could help to ensure that employees are not worked so often or
so hard that they lose productivity, develop serious health problems or,
in the worst scenario, die. 97 These reports indicate that death by over-
ing comprehensive health care benefits). Commentators praised the Saturn labor agree-
ment because it encouraged the company to invest in its employees and employees to
invest in their company. See also Robert Reich, Labor Secretary Robert Reich Ad-
dress to the Organization for a New Equality, REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT, Apr. 23,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (suggesting that Saturn used on
the job training, management-labor cooperation and profit sharing to create a partner-
ship between labor and management which has made Saturn the "most successful car"
of General Motors).
194. See THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, INVESTING IN PEOPLE: THE ECONOMICS OF POP-
ULATION QUALITY 38-39 (1981) (suggesting that extensive public health programs
implemented in India during the 1950s caused an extraordinary decline in the mortali-
ty rate and a 36% increase in agricultural production); Anetta Miller and Elizabeth
Bradburn, Shape Up-Or Else, NEwSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 42 (noting that preventable
illnesses account for 15% to 25% of all employee health care costs).
195. See Carol Krucoff, Energizing the Sedentary Workplace, WASH. POST, Apr.
16, 1991, at Z16 (noting that Mesa Ltd. Part., a United States company which pro-
vides extensive preventative care programs for its employees, saves $1.6 million annu-
ally on reduced health care expenses); Business Wire Inc., Study Shows Mesa's Inno-
vative Employee Fitness Program Controls Health Care Costs, Improves Productivity,
Bus. WIRE Apr. 23, 1990 (noting that Mesa's per employee health care costs dropped
to 60% less than the national average and that its worker absentee average dropped
to less than half the national average); Barbara Marsh, Wellness Programs Hedge
Against Future Health Care Costs, JACKSONVILLE Bus. J., June 1, 1990, at 13 (citing
a Florida health care executive who claimed that each dollar spent on preventative
health care could save employers an estimated $3.60 in lower health care costs, re-
duced absenteeism and increased productivity).
196. See Christine Woolsey, Study Sees Big Savings From National Health Care,
Bus. INSURANCE, Nov. 4, 1991, at 2 (suggesting that United States employers would
save trillions of dollars if their government established a comprehensive health care
system similar to that of Canada or Germany).
197. See Kevin Rafferty, Killer Karoshi: Japanese Begin to Admit That Workahol-
ism is Deadly, OrAwA CITIZEN, Sept. 6, 1992, at E6 (noting that the Japanese Labor
Ministry has implemented new labor regulations, created special health care centers,
and developed governmental guidelines to prevent this occurrence).
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work, or "karoshi," as referred to in Japan, claims up to 10,000 victims
per year in that country, where excessive work hours and no vacations
are the norm.'98 Also, although the Japanese legislature has tried to es-
tablish new labor standards in recent years, Japanese employers and
courts have largely ignored these standards." Regardless of the fact
that different societies maintain distinct work philosophies,' post-Cas-
tro constitution drafters might consider the Japanese experience in de-
ciding whether or not to recognize a right to healthy working conditions.
The right to education may further benefit a nation's productive pow-
er by ensuring that a society's workforce possesses the volume and
breadth of intellectual skills needed to maintain different occupations and
industries."' Several reports indicate that the most competitive eco-
nomic actors are those who constantly train and retrain people to ensure
that neither products nor workers become obsolete.' As information
and technology involved in virtually all economic sectors expand at an
astronomical rate,' investment in education appears to be a commit-
198. See iL (demonstrating that Japanese people work more hours and take fewer
vacations than people in any other industrial country).
199. See id (noting that despite a Japanese regulation prohibiting employers from
forcing employees to work more than eight hours a day or 40 hours a week, a judge
recently permitted a large company to fire an employee because he refused to work
overtime).
200. See Reid Collins, Comparison of U.S.. Japanese and German Work Ethics,
(CNN Television broadcast, Mar. 30, 1992), available in LEX1S, News Library,
Curaws File (noting that people in Japan maintain a significantly stronger cultural
attachment to long working hours and minimal vacations than people in the United
States or Germany).
201. See SCHULTZ, supra note 194, at 33 (demonstrating a positive quantitative
correlation between investment in education and growth in national income); Poor
Basic Skills Cost Britain 8.4 Billion A Year, Report Says, PRESS ASSOCIATION
NEWSFILE, Sept. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinaf-
ter Poor Basic Skills] (citing a study which indicates that each year British industry
could save up to 8.4 billion pounds and the government could save up to 1 billion
pounds if they improved the nation's education skills).
202. See Poor Basic Skills, supra note 201, (citing a study of British industries
which indicates that a deficiency in essential education skills has caused labor produc-
tivity in that country to rank 20 out of 22 Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development countries); Manufacturing: Less Is More, ECONOMIST, May 25,
1991, at 75 available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (citing a study of large
manufacturing firms in Germany which indicates that the most productive firms "spent
six times more per employee on education and training than their less successful ri-
vals").
203. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETmVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 628
(1990) (suggesting that in order to become or stay prosperous, nations must ensure
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ment that Cuba cannot afford to overlook."0
A highly skilled workforce also is needed to expand Cuba's base of
production from today's dominant sugar economy"5 to a diversified
and industrialized system.' Cuba could employ educational resources
to change its economic focus from volume oriented production (i.e.
agriculture and textiles) to skill oriented production (i.e. telecommunica-
tions and electronics) as several societies with roughly similar size and
natural resources already have done.2" This change would be extreme-
ly difficult, however, without a large workforce trained in education
intensive disciplines such as science, medicine, technology, and informa-
that its citizens meet the "high and rising" world standards for education and train-
ing); Cantwell, supra note 192, at 45 (stating that the United States' leadership in
high technology industries is based on a huge national investment in education and
research).
204. PORTER, supra note 203, at 628.
205. See David Clark Scott, From Paltry Sugar Crop, Cubans May Reap Political
Change, CHRIST. SCI. MON., June 22, 1993, at 1 (noting that the sugar industry is
the number one source of income for Cuba and that the 40% decline in sugar pro-
duction during 1993 has had devastating effects on the economy); Gunn, supra note
I, at 3 (noting that between 1991 and 1993, state subsidies to the sugar and agri-
cultural industries accounted for 54% of the Cuban budget deficit); Mesa-Lago, Socio-
economic Performance, supra note 127, at 18 (noting that despite high expectations,
the sugar industry continues to dominate the Cuban economy and efforts to diversify
the nonsugar sector have failed); Preeg, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that in 1989 the
sugar industry constituted 67% of all foreign exchange receipts in Cuba).
206. See PORTER, supra note 203, at 628 (suggesting that education and training
can best promote industrial development); Preeg, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that
Cuba's low-wage, highly educated work force could attract significant private invest-
ment). Cuba's historical failure to cultivate high skill jobs and to diversify its econo-
my has fueled the nation's economic dependence on larger countries. See RONALDO
MUNCK, THE NEw INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STUDIES 48-49 (1988) (noting that in the
mid-1920s foreign owned sugar mills, which accounted for three-quarters of all Cuba's
sugar production, caused Cubans to abandon most economic activities that were not
linked to the sugar and coffee sectors).
207. See Preeg, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that during the 1980s the Caribbean
economies experienced a dramatic shift in foreign exchange earnings away from agri-
cultural commodities toward tourism, manufacturing, and service industries); Thalif
Deen, Put People in the Picture, Says UNDP, INTER PRESS SERVICE, May 13, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating that the World Bank and the
United Nations Development Program cited the increase in South Korea's and
Thailand's overall economic growth and labor productivity by 11% a year between
1963 and 1979 in South Korea and by 63% between 1980 and 1985 in Thailand re-
sulted from the newly industrialized countries' policy of channeling investments into
education and training).
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tion systems."
Whereas the social and economic rights noted above often promote
high quality and low cost products, too many or the wrong kind of
social and economic guarantees easily could reduce national productivi-
ty.' For example, universal guarantees of employment might force
governments to employ workers far in excess of those which private
industries would hire in their capacity as rational economic actors!" If
a society hires a surplus of workers who are not needed to produce the
desired output, the additional employment will unnecessarily raise labor
costs, threaten revenue and reduce the overall profitability of items man-
ufactured in that society."
A constitutional right to specific labor guarantees (i.e. forty hour work
week, eight hour work day, and affirmative action hiring programs) also
could hinder national productivity by formalizing regulations which pro-
mote a current business goal but restrict economic vitality in the long
term.212 If a nation's constitution universally and drastically limits the
ability of employers and employees to tailor labor contracts to the needs
of individual industries, then employers will be locked into a potentially
unprofitable working climate, and capitalists, both domestic and foreign,
208. See Reich, supra note 193 (stating that technology will replace individuals
who do not have basic education and training in the fields of computers, mathematics
and communications); PORTER, supra note 203, at 627-30 (stating several reasons why
governments must establish and maintain high educational standards).
209. See Schwartz, Economic and Social Rights, supra note 18, at 561 (suggesting
that overly detailed labor guarantees interfere with the efficiency of market-oriented
economies and that in many societies provisions of this nature have been amended
frequently or abolished over time).
210. See Mesa-Lago, Socioeconomic Performance, supra note 127, at 28 (stating
that during the 1960s, Cuba maintained full employment "by transforming open em-
ployment into underemployment at the expense of a sharp decrease in labor productiv-
ity" and that during the 1970s, "the priorities were reversed and labor productivity
rose from bottom to top priority while full employment deteriorated"); Scott Baldauf,
US Productivity Slides, CHRIST. Sct. MON., Aug. 11, 1993, at 20 (noting that the
price of labor accounts for approximately two-thirds of the cost of a product).
211. See Chavira, supra note 133, at IA (suggesting that Cuba's vertical economic
organization, with the state managing all economic activity, has resulted in grossly
inefficient economic production).
212. See Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, supra note 17, at 36 (suggesting that
constitutions should not force governments to interfere with free markets); Schwartz,
Aiming High, supra note 18, at 26 (stating that constitutional provisions that contain
specific economic limitations are highly susceptible to change); Samuel Brittan, Clues
to Rising Unemployment, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 1993, at 18 (noting that labor regula-
tions can lead to increased unemployment).
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will be less likely to invest in that country."' For this reason, future
Cuban elites might decide that, although minimal labor protections can
contribute to a healthy workforce, a constitution is the improper place
for a detailed labor code.214
Post-Castro constitution drafters might threaten further the economic
stability of Cuba by creating promises based predominantly on social
aspirations (i.e. universal guarantees to housing and food) which the
government could not afford to honor without extreme difficulty." If
a new Cuban government were to honor such constitutional commit-
ments, the financial base of the new government, which already would
be limited due to the recent economic crisis, would drastically
shrink."6 If Cuba's new government failed to honor these guarantees,
then the domestic political community and the international economic
community would lose faith in the legal system, which in turn would
substantially disturb the national investment climate." 7
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: REVISITING THE 1940 CONSTITUTION
After balancing the aforementioned historical, political and economic
213. See Brandon Mitchener, A Gloomy Birthday For German Unity, INT'L HER-
ALD TRIB., Oct. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that
the new German labor policy of wage parity for East and West German workers has
caused severe unemployment in East Germany and has led potential investors to favor
nations which do not apply similar labor restrictions).
214. See Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, supra note 17, at 37 (noting that be-
cause they lack the bureaucratic machinery contained in the political branches of gov-
ernment, courts are ill-equipped to enforce specific administrative standards articulated
in a national charter).
215. See Ricardo Chavira and David Marcus, Cuba: Communist Dream on the
Brink of Disaster, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 29, 1993, at A5, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File (suggesting that Cuba currently does not even have ade-
quate resources to fulfill its commitments to education and health care); Mesa-Lago,
Social Safety Net, supra note 6, at 645 (noting that, despite Castro's promise to build
100,000 dwelling units each year, the Cuban Government built only 18,315 units be-
tween 1986 and 1989).
216. Id.
217. See Richard Ehrlich, Japan: Ignoring Protests to Expand Business Reach in
Asia, INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (recognizing that Japanese companies have resisted making major invest-
ments in Cambodia due to that country's sensitive political stability); Judy Dempsey,
Clashes Erupt As Albanian Refugees Shun Repatriation, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991, at
2 (noting that, despite favorable economic reforms, Albania has not attracted foreign
investors due to its fragile political stability).
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considerations, post-Castro constitution drafters should retain from the
1940 Constitution those guarantees which are both politically and eco-
nomically desirable. An appropriate example in this category of guaran-
tees is the right to education,2t contained in Articles 48 and 49, be-
cause it is likely to generate more money than it costs.2"9 Furthermore,
the language contained in these provisions, which guarantees universal
and free primary and secondary education, is no more extensive than
that provided in international treaties and charters of several industrializ-
ing and progressive nations.'
Although the 1940 Constitution did not include the right to receive
medical care, post-Castro constitution drafters should consider creating
such a right because it has become part of Cuba's historical and politi-
cal legacy. 2 Although economic statistics indicate that the cost effec-
tiveness of health care applies more to preventative care than to com-
prehensive care,' future Cuban decision-makers should recognize that
most Cubans would sacrifice some economic stability in order to retain
what they feel is one of the greatest achievements of the social revolu-
tion.' Because a guarantee of complete health care is likely to be ex-
218. 1940 CONST. arts. 48-49, translated in PEASLEE supra note 11, at 610.
219. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (noting that most state subsidized
education and training programs are economically beneficial propositions).
220. See HUNG. CONST. (1990) art. 70(F), translated in National Telecommunica-
tion Information Service, supra note 13 (declaring that "[t]he Republic of Hungary
shall ensure the right of the citizens to education" and that "[tlhe Republic of Hunga-
ry shall realize this right by extending public education and making it generally avail-
able, by means of free and compulsory primary school, by secondary and higher edu-
cation, accessible on the basis of ability to all, and by financial support to those be-
ing educated"); Polish Charter on Rights and Liberties (1992) art. 29(2). translated in
National Telecommunications Information Service, supra note 13 (declaring that
"[miandatory elementary education is free in public schools"); BULG. CONST. (1991)
art. 53, translated in CONSTTUTIONS, supra note 13 (declaring that "[t]he right to
education is universal" and that "[p]rimary and secondary education in state and town-
ship schools is free").
221. See supra notes 140, 141, 143 and accompanying text (acknowledging the
popular demand in Cuba for universal health care guarantees); Chavira. supra note
133, at IA (same); Making the Best, supra note 129 at 37 (same).
222. See Frank Swoboda, AFL-CIO Backs Tax For Health Care, WASH. POST,
Feb. 17, 1993, at F3 (noting that a comprehensive national health reform plan is like-
ly to cost the government billions of dollars in additional spending); Condition Criti-
cal: Canadian Health System Has Many Ills, SAN DIwEo UNION-TRIB., Mar. 10, 1993,
at B-8 (suggesting that Canada's allocation of huge financial resources to universal
and comprehensive health care services has become unprofitable and unaffordable).
223. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting widespread dedication to
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pensive, however, Cuba should realize that it probably will lack the re-
sources to honor similarly strong constitutional commitments to fulfill
other social goalsY4
For those guarantees contained in the 1940 Constitution which are
socially desirable but are also too detailed to be economically beneficial,
post-Castro drafters should revise the provisions to reflect Cuba's nation-
al aspirations without binding the government to any specific action.2
For example, constitution drafters should transform the universal guar-
antee of eight hour work days, forty-four hour work weeks, one month
annual paid vacation and twelve weeks maternity leave (Art. 66-68)226
into a general commitment calling for the use of "best efforts" or "rea-
sonable measures" to promote healthy working conditions. 7 Similarly
general guarantees should be created by revising the right to social
security included in Article 65" and the right to shelter included in
the protection of education, health care and social security).
224. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (noting that Cuba already is
struggling to honor its most basic social commitments).
225. See Schwartz, Economic and Social Rights, supra note 18, at 562-63 (recog-
nizing the value of vague constitutional provisions for guarantees like the right to
work because the unrestrictive language permits governments to maintain their stron-
gest possible commitment to national goals regardless of the economic climate pre-
vailing at any particular time).
226. 1940 CONST. arts. 66-68, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 11, at 623. Arti-
cle 66 creates a maximum work day of eight hours which "can be reduced to six
hours daily for those over fourteen and less than eighteen years of age." Id. art.
66(1). This Article further declares that "[t]he maximum working week shall be forty
four hours, equivalent to forty- eight in wages, excepting these industries which, be-
cause of their nature, must produce uninterruptedly during a certain part of the year."
Id. art. 66(2). Article 67 declares that "[tihe right to a paid vacation of one month
for each eleven months of work in each calendar year is established for all manual
and intellectual workers." Id. art. 67(1) Article 68 declares that "[dluring the six
weeks immediately preceding childbirth, and the six that follow it, [a female employ-
ee] shall enjoy compulsory rest, with compensation equal to what she was paid for
working, retaining her position and all the rights attached to it and covered by her
labor contract" and that "[i]n the nursing period she shall be allowed two special rest
periods a day, of one-half hour each, to nurse her child." Id. art. 68(3).
227. See Charter on Rights and Liberties (Pol. 1992) art. 31, supra note 13
(promoting "safe and hygienic working conditions" by declaring that national legisla-
tion will regulate minimum working conditions and annual paid vacation periods);
BULG. CONST. (1991) art. 48(5), supra note 13 (guaranteeing the right to safe work-
ing conditions, minimum wages, and compensation for work as provided by law);
YUGO. CONST. (1992) art. 56, supra note 13 (guaranteeing work hours, rest and vaca-
tion, as defined by law).
228. 1940 CONST. art. 65, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 11, at 622-23. This
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Article 79.29 These modifications would allow Cuba to honor the spir-
it of its constitutional heritage and at the same promote economic stabil-
ity by avoiding the restrictive language associated with excessively de-
tailed rights.3
Post-Castro drafters should not include in the new charter a universal
right to employment, as mandated by Article 60,"' or to irrevocable
property ownership, as mandated by Article 91,' because Cubans no
longer consider these guarantees to be sacrosanct. ' In fact, many peo-
ple on the island are skeptical of these promises because they have wit-
nessed in recent years the right to employment become the right to
underemployment and the right of all people to own property become a
right reserved to the state.' Future Cuban legislators should also de-
provision declares that "[slocial security is established as an irenounceable and non-
prescribable right of workers", id. art. 65(1), and that "[s]ocial security funds or re-
serves cannot be subjected to transfer, nor can they be disposed of for purposes other
than those for which they were created." Id. art. 65(4).
229. Id. art. 79. This provision declares that "It]he Nation shall promote the build-
ing of cheap dwellings for workers", and that "[t]he law shall determine the enterpris-
es which, because they employ workers away from populated places, shall be required
to furnish to the workers suitable dwellings, schools, infirmaries, and other services
and attentions favorable to the physical and moral welfare of the worker and his fam-
ily:' Id.
230. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (suggesting that loosely defined
rights for certain constitutional guarantees may work to a nation's benefit).
231. 1940 CONST. art. 60, translated in PEASLE , supra note 11, at 622. This
provision declares that "[l]abor is an inalienable right of the individual" and that
"[tihe Nation shall employ the resources within its reach to furnish employment to
every one who lacks it and shall assure to every manual or intellectual worker the
economic conditions necessary to a fitting existence." ld.
232. See supra note 103 (reciting Article 91 of the Cuban Constitution).
233. See Farah, supra note 3, at Al, A27 (noting that during the early 1990s, the
Castro government introduced market initiatives that permitted managers of state
owned farms and enterprises to fire inefficient workers and lay off surplus labor);
Gunn, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that the 1992 Constitution establishes a commitment
to state ownership of property that is considerably less serious than the commitments
created by the previous three Cuban constitutions).
234. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (stating that the guarantee of full
employment gives rise to unintended and undesirable results). During the era of the
1976 and 1992 constitutions, Cuban governments increasingly restricted the right to
private property in reality as well as in effect. Compare 1940 CoNsr. art. 87, trans-
lated in PEASL.E, supra note 11, at 626 (declaring that "[t]he Cuban Nation recogniz-
es the existence and legitimacy of private property in its broadest concept as a social
function and without other limitations than those which, for reasons of public necessi-
ty or social interest, are established by law") with 1976 CONST. art. 14, translated in
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cline to include universal promises of employment and property owner-
ship also in the new Cuban constitution because these provisions seri-
ously restrict the nation's ability to eliminate unprofitable economic
resources and to pursue economic development."
CONCLUSION
Cuba in the 1990s maintains a fragile legal system. Because Cuba
suffers from political and economic isolation, the government is unable
to honor the extensive social and economic commitments of its 1992
Constitution. Furthermore, because Castro retains the ability to suspend,
redefine or abandon Cuban constitutional rights at any time, one cannot
assume that either he or the legislature will enforce or recognize any of
these allegedly guaranteed rights. If the Cuban Government wants to
earn the confidence of its citizens, potential investors, and foreign gov-
ernments, it must create a constitution providing rights that all future
Cuban administrations can and will enforce.
The 1940 Constitution provides an excellent reference tool from which
post-Castro constitution drafters might work. This document contains a
broad array of governmental obligations that the Cuban Government has
honored or attempted to honor for more than half a century.236 Instead
of starting anew, post-Castro constitution drafters should reexamine this
document to learn how the language of each provision affected the
political, economic and social landscape of Cuba.
In 1940, and throughout the history of the island, the Cuban people
have expressed a strong desire for their government to provide social
and economic commitments.237 The national ambition, to create a Cuba
that satisfies the most essential human needs of its citizens, remains
strong today. 38 For this reason, the creation of a new constitution
De la Cuesta, CONST., supra note 122, at 6 (declaring that all the people own all the
property) and 1992 CONST. art. 19, translated in FBIS, supra note 134, at 3 (same).
235. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (implying that full employment
and economic productivity are antithetical goals). The 1940 constitution explicitly dis-
courages economic development with the use of foreign capital. See 1940 CONST. art.
90, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 11, at 626 (declaring that "[t]he acquisition and
possession of land by foreign persons and companies shall be restrictively limited by
law, which shall provide measures tending to restore land to Cubans").
236. Supra notes 218-30 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (suggesting that Cuba maintains a
strong historical, ethnic and cultural attachment to social commitment).
238. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (noting the popular support for
Cuban social services); Gunn, supra note 1, at 10 (concluding that Cubans would
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without social and economic guarantees would be contrary to the politi-
cal will of the Cuban people.
In responding to the political will of the people, however, post-Castro
constitution drafters must exercise great care in distinguishing legitimate
national expectations from generic national aspirations. 9 Future Cuban
elites bear the responsibility of creating a set of social and economic
commitments that the people will embrace and the government can
provide without undue hardship. Because Cuba's leaders structured Cu-
ban society during the last several decades so as to uphold these guaran-
tees, constitution drafters may struggle in delineating a realistic set of
undeniable rights. They must, nevertheless, undertake this effort. The
provisions they select may determine whether and to what extent the
post-Castro government succeeds.
sacrifice greater economic prosperity in order to preserve a strong social safety net).
239. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (suggesting that a state will jeop-
ardize the legitimacy of its constitution if it creates excessive, unenforceable or ill-
defined rights).
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